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gozar neighbourhood
jihad holy war
kalantar elder
Kuchis nomadic people
loya jirga “grand council” similar to shuras, or consultative assemblies
mujaheddin fighters in the jihad, or holy war
qanoon madari civil law
rawaj customary law
safayi municipal service charge and property tax
Shari’a/Shariat Islamic jurisprudence
sharwali wolayat provincial municipality
shura local/community council
tashkeel staffing establishment or list of sanctioned posts
wakil-e gozar (wakil) neighbourhood representative
wasita personal relationships through which political/other favours may
be obtained
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Afghanistan is facing tremendous challenges
on its way to peace, democracy and
prosperity. Its fast-growing and vibrant cities,
which host roughly a quarter of the country’s
population, pose particular development
problems but also carry significant potential
for advancing social and economic well-being
if they are diligently managed and inclusively
governed. Against a background discussion
of widespread urban vulnerability in
Afghanistan, this paper explores the critical
challenges for urban governance and urban
management. The analysis draws on research
conducted in three Afghan cities — the capital
city, Kabul, in the central east; Herat City
near the western border with Iran; and Mazar-
i-Sharif, close to the northwestern border
with Uzbekistan — as well as on interviews
with informants from Afghan ministries,
municipalities, international development
agencies and local and international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) involved
in urban programmes and projects.
The overall analysis suggests that there is an
acute need for a more coordinated approach
to urban management and greater focus on
urban governance. Both require flexible
approaches as well as enhanced cooperation
between government departments as well as
between those departments and city
residents. This is particularly critical in the
context of land administration and housing.
Insecurity and inaccessibility of tenure are
currently very important causes of urban
vulnerability. Housing shortages and high
land prices, strict building standards and
regulations deriving from the days of master
planning,  as  wel l  as  burdensome
administrative procedures based on ideal
norms rather than the realities of local
circumstances have made a rise in informal
construction inevitable. Informal settlements
now account for the larger part of houses in
Executive Summary
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 1
Shaping Urban Futures: Challenges to Governing and Managing Afghan Cities
Afghanistan’s urban centres. High rents,
diminished housing stock and the influx of
returnees, internally displaced people and
expatriate development workers all
exacerbate the problem. The absence of an
effective and coherent land management
system in growing urban centres has provided
opportunities for illicit dealings, whether by
politicians, government officials, private
militias or unscrupulous land developers.
Vast service delivery backlogs exist, alongside
gaps between serviced and unserviced
households and areas. These need to be
urgently closed, with a particular focus on
the interconnection between water supply,
sanitation and solid waste management but
also electricity, education and health
facilities. Community management of informal
service provision needs to be acknowledged
and the potential of community participation
strengthened to ensure greater involvement
of and responsiveness to local demand and
to ensure better downward accountability,
particularly in the face of local-level
corruption. Furthermore, government
institutions need to increase their capacity
to work with civil society organisations and
to coordinate and regulate initiatives by non-
governmental actors. However, cooperation
with municipal employees and coordination
with government and other actors is essential
not only for urban community development
but citywide development strategies as well.
When this works well, NGOs can be a linchpin
in urban management, helping to combat
corruption, promoting information exchange
and communication and fostering local
empowerment in urban governance.
The urgency of addressing urban vulnerability
is underscored by the alarming degree of
horizontal social disintegration in cities. This
is evidenced by fragile networks and lack of
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)2
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trust, conditions that make issue-based
grassroots level collective action difficult.
This works against citizen involvement in
urban management. Similarly, local structures
of representation vary in terms of their
effectiveness and the extent to which they
are representative, particularly of women
and younger people. Lastly, the research
suggests that there is still much to be done
before Afghan ownership of current urban
reform processes is achieved.
Policy implications in brief
Local policymakers and officials clearly face
a difficult challenge to change both their
mindsets and practices in a fast changing
context and within a system where for many,
skills are outdated and where investment
comes primarily from sources other than
government. Government departments
responsible for urban development need to
know the amount of financial support they
can expect and have at their discretion and
which areas and services will be prioritised
by funders and to be consulted in both. This
suggests in turn increasing the degree of
donor coordination and of the urban sector
more generally. A wider range of skills
associated with urban planning and
management are also required in a context
where the future of urban development in
Afghanistan is likely to rest less with a narrow
perspective on urban design and more with
strategic urban management, driven by multi-
sector partnerships involving not only
government and the private sector but also
representatives of communities and donors.
This can be addressed immediately in the
context of area-based urban development
and in the medium and longer term through
related capacity building efforts that create
the basis for sustainable urban management
capacity and inclusive and accountable urban
governance.
Achieving effective urban management in
Afghanistan means balancing and prioritising
limited resources against overwhelming needs.
This is largely a political process and one
that requires attention to re-building trust
in the mechanisms and structures of urban
governance. Above all, channels of
communication between government
agencies, international and bilateral donors,
and agents and organisations of civil society
need to be reviewed and improved. It is
important to work with what exists, as it
easier to destroy than to build institutions.
Thus a fine balance needs to be struck
between challenging and capitalising on
existing organisations and systems of delivery
and accountability. Towards this end, the
visibility and responsiveness of government-
administered services needs to be
strengthened; grassroots level collective
action needs to be fostered; and
institutionalised platforms need to be
developed to increase the voice and leverage
of citizens.
Recommendations
Key recommendations brought forward on
the basis of this comparative analysis have
been divided into city-specific priorities and
more holistic longitudinal measures.
• In Kabul, security of tenure should be
given first priority. A second key concern
is to clarify the relationship between
Kabul Municipality and the Ministry of
Urban Development and Housing (MUDH)
and to enhance communication and
coordination between them.
• In Mazar, large sections of the city wait
to be connected to water and sewerage
systems and rely on private generators
for energy. Furthermore, employment
generation is critical in a provincial capital
where years of conflict saw the
decimation of industrial production and
in a province where poppy production is
a profitable alternative to limited legal
economic opportunities.
Area of
Concern
Immediate Measures Intermediate
Approaches
Forward-looking
Strategies
Planning (Local) Work with and build on
existing master planning skills
(but not the master plan);
encourage risk-taking behaviour.
(National) Introduce
participatory and collaborative
planning through a “learning by
doing” approach in the context
of project development/NUP.
(National) Ensure all urban
projects, programmes and plans
are harmonised within the
context of the NUP, guided by
a strategic urban policy
framework.
Skills
Development
(Provincial/Inter-city) Work
towards updating practice and
creating experience through
existing area-based
development programmes.
(Provincial/Inter-city) Promote
educational visits to other
countries and demonstration
projects.
(Provincial/Inter-city) Develop
skills in working with informality
in housing, infrastructure and
service provision in the context
of projects and programmes.
(Supranational) Ensure
investment in skilled staff,
equipment, advisors to MUDH
and other ministries.
(National) Integrate on-the-job
capability enhancement with
curriculum development in
universities and technical
colleges, with a focus on urban
planning and management but
where relevant, still located
within existing architecture/
engineering faculties.
Access to
Housing
(Local) Work towards immediate
security of tenure for vulnerable
urban dwellers, alongside larger
land titling exercises.
(Local) Begin to harmonise
informal security of tenure
measures at the neighbourhood
level or in the context of
projects with formal land titling
exercises.
(Local) Introduce and monitor
infringements or violation of
land titles and security of tenure
within an ongoing process of
land titling.
Cooperation (Provincial/Inter-city) Foster
urban partnerships through
issue-based workshops.
(Provincial/Inter-city) Conduct
capacity-building workshops on
citywide imperatives.
(Provincial/Inter-city) Develop
integrated area-based projects
involving multi-sector partners
and with tangible skills
development and capability
building dimensions.
(Provincial/Inter-city) Extend
integrated area-based project
approaches to citywide
development strategies with
local authorities coordinating a
wider array of urban
development partners.
National Urban
Programme
(NUP)
Implementation
(Provincial/Inter-city) Create
commitment to and ownership
of the NUP through facilitated
discussion, workshops and
application to real-life
problems.
(National) Operationalise the
NUP through concrete
interventions; implement
through government
departments with clear
milestones and performance
benchmarks.
(National) Work towards a
sustainable resource base for
the implementation of the NUP
in all provincial centres; ensure
institutionalisation of
performance improvement.
Citizen Dialogue (Local) Set in place
organisational mechanisms for
more extensive involvement of
local representatives.
(National) Ensure government
staff awareness of Independent
Administrative Reform and Civil
Service Commission.
(Local) Create structures for
regular consultation/
communication with urban
dwellers about priorities and
budgets.
(Local) Strengthen and
institutionalise structures for
regular consultation/
communication between
government and urban dwellers.
(National) Strengthen citizens’
ability to engage proactively
with NUP/ planning processes
through continuous civic
education.
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Table 1. Areas of concern and sequencing of recommendations
• Conversely, in Herat a hard look needs
to be taken at the dominance of privatised
(re)construction and the potential
exclusion of minorities and the lowest
income echelons from improvements in
infrastructure, services and economic
growth. The implication here is the need
for a more cautious and inclusive urban
development strategy.
In addition to city-specific issues, a set of
cohesive and sequenced recommendations
apply across all large urban centres in
Afghanistan. Actions are divided into
immediate measures, intermediate
approaches and forward-looking strategies.
Area of
Concern
Immediate Measures Intermediate
Approaches
Forward-looking
Strategies
Corruption (National) Build on public
awareness of corruption by
setting up an effective urban
monitoring group.
(National) Assess
growth/effectiveness of the
urban monitoring group on
corruption via appraisals and
consultation with agencies.
(National) Enforce anti-
corruption measures through
sufficient funding, consultation
and monitoring accountability
to citizens.
Coordination (Supranational) Work to avoid
the worst excesses of politicised
funding of infrastructure and
services by continuing to
prioritise and institutionalise
proper consultation and
coordination.
(Supranational) Strengthen the
coordinating function of MUDH;
clarify the role of the MUDH vis-
a-vis municipalities, especially
in Kabul; ensure compatibility
of NUP implementation with
local priorities, focusing on
urban vulnerability.
(National) Streamline MUDH and
monitor the effectiveness of
new structures through peer
reviews and citizen satisfaction
surveys.
Revenue
Generation
(Supranational) Strengthen
revenue generation and
collection through the Ministry
of Finance.
(Provincial/Inter-city)
Encourage local revenue
generation activities on the part
of municipalities to foster fiscal
sustainability.
(National) Extend local revenue
generation activities for some
enhanced fiscal autonomy on
the part of municipalities while
ensuring returns to central
government and cohesion with
national policies through
coordination by a streamlined
MUDH.
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Urban centres are increasingly characterised
by rising poverty, vulnerability, environmental
hazards and health risks. This gives rise to
insecurity and lack of safety on the part of
urban dwellers. These problems are
exacerbated in post-war contexts. In conflict
cities, urban citizens are often doubtful of
the ability of municipalities and governments
to provide them with a safe, secure and
affordable living and working environment.
The disenchantment and exclusion of urban
residents, particularly the most vulnerable
among them, is often reinforced by
inefficiency and corruption. For example, in
conflict situations tight control over access
to resources and decision-making by minority
elites can be greater. This issues paper focuses
on urban vulnerability in Afghanistan, explored
in the context of challenges to urban
management and governance. Research for
this study was conducted across three cities.
They included the capital city, Kabul, as well
as two provincial capitals: Herat City, close
to the Iranian border to the west and Mazar-
i-Sharif to the north, close to the border with
Uzbekistan.1 Urban vulnerability in
contemporary Afghanistan derives above all
from the physical legacy of war. This includes
destruction of infrastructure and housing and
lack of investment in services. Also evident
is the social legacy of war in cities, involving
the displacement of people, fragmentation
of support and social networks, as well as
the exclusion of particular groups of people
from full participation in urban life. Urban
vulnerability is framed by a broad institutional
landscape that embraces not only government
institutions, such as municipalities and line
1.  Introduction and Background
Ph
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1 Originally a southern city was also to be included, either Kandahar or Jalalabad. However, the deteriorating security
situation in the run up to the 2004 presidential elections, during which time the field research was conducted, made this
impossible.
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ministries concerned with urban issues, but
also what are termed “socially embedded
institutions” such as households, community-
level organisations, as well as customary
institutions such as the shura and loya jirga.
Important as well are wider networks and
interest groups that influence or are
influenced by urban processes and outcomes,
such as international development agencies
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
involved in the urban sphere, profiled in this
report.
Against this background, this paper analyses
the critical challenges for urban management
in Afghanistan. Important among the issues
to be tackled is poor access to urban land
and insecurity of tenure, experienced by a
wide spectrum of urban residents. Another
challenge is the need to move beyond dated
forms of master planning towards strategic
development at the city level. This is rendered
urgent by service backlogs and the demands
on city management posed by the growth of
informal and new unserviced areas in most
urban centres. However, urban management
is not simply a technical exercise and the
challenge of accountability is paramount
across all these areas.
These management challenges can only be
realistically and effectively addressed in the
context of improved urban governance, with
the latter understood as state–society
relations at the city level.  The challenge of
urban governance has two sides. The first is
to create a sense of urban “citizenship.” In
other words, there is a challenge to create
among urban dwellers a sense of belonging
in and responsibility towards the city and the
urban environment. This is only possible if
all people feel as if they have a stake and
voice in urban policy and planning or that
they can hold local government to account.
The second challenge of urban governance
is to build accountable and responsive
government both within cities and within
those higher tiers of government responsible
for urban development. The report seeks to
identify opportunities and constraints for
pursuing this agenda within Afghanistan’s
urban centres. The paper concludes by
identifying some forward-looking strategies
for addressing urban vulnerability and
strengthening and reforming institutions.
1.1 Rationale and relevance
In the most recent Human Development Index,
Afghanistan was reported to have the second
lowest life expectancy in the world (43.1
years), the second lowest adult literacy rate
(36 percent), by far the highest infant and
under-five mortality rate (165/257 per 1,000
live births) and the second largest proportion
of under-nourished people (70 percent). This
status is among those countries not even
listed in the main ranking due to an overall
scarcity of data.2 Indeed, the absence of
reliable data and meaningful indicators
constitutes a real handicap in efforts to
monitor progress. In the past, poor social
indicators were seen as problems mainly of
the countryside. Increasingly, however, social
disadvantage and urban vulnerability are
being recognised as key components of
Afghanistan’s contemporary experience. In
addressing these issues a critical starting
point must be the baseline data needed to
track urban recovery.
While accurate statistics remain elusive, it
is generally agreed that the urban population
has increased dramatically since the fall of
the Taliban, with the current urban population
of Afghanistan estimated to be between 5.6
and 6.4 million, constituting from 23.3 to 30
percent of the total population of the
country.3 Urbanisation has been largely
prompted by refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs) returning to the cities. This
2 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). Human Development Report. 2003. Available online:
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003 (accessed on 25th March 2004); 339.
3 The first figure derives from UNDESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs). World Urbanization
Prospects: The 2003 Revision, Population Division 1. New York: UN. 2004, while the upper numbers were estimates provided
by Government of Afghanistan (GoA). Securing Afghanistan’s Future. Urban Technical Annex. January 2004.
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they do to reclaim their assets or to take
advantage of the perceived benefits and
livelihood opportunities offered by urban life.
Under such conditions it is misleading to think
of Afghanistan only as a rural country.
However, around 70 percent of urban dwellers
live in only six cities: Kabul, Kandahar, Herat,
Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad and Kunduz. Hence
urbanisation is concentrated, which places
tremendous pressure on urban land, shelter
and services.4
In Afghanistan’s cities urban infrastructure
has been under strain for some time due to
service backlogs in previously planned areas
and the destruction wrought by decades of
war. Political conflict also meant limited
investment in infrastructure and services and
led to deterioration in the urban environment
and housing stock. Together these factors
mean that informal dwellings now constitute
the bulk of Afghanistan’s urban housing stock.
If ignored and if services are left unattended,
the quality of life and human development
of growing numbers of urban Afghans will be
adversely affected. Ignoring informal
settlements can also have a wider impact on
city management. In the face of inefficient
and unresponsive government departments
people seek solutions for themselves. When
these relate to goods such as water supply
and sanitation, a level of coordination is
necessary for the good of the city at large,
something that is usually absent when local
“do-it-yourself” approaches prevail.
Moreover, when people lose their trust in
government and opt out of the responsibilities
of citizenship, for example by not paying
taxes, this can adversely affect revenue
generation and ultimately official delivery
capacity and potential.
Afghanistan is moving from an immediate
post-war situation, in which interventions
aimed at relief and rehabilitation
predominate, towards a situation where a
focus on reconstruction and development is
increasingly appropriate. The former Minister
of Finance, Ashraf Ghani, said not long before
the study was conducted that he did not want
people to talk any longer about “post-conflict
reconstruction” but rather “development”.
It is advisable in most war-torn regions,
including Afghanistan, to see reconstruction
and development taking place in a context
of “conflict management” rather than “post-
conflict” given that factional and other
tensions continue to prevail and that in any
case, development is necessarily a contested
and sometimes conflictual process as people
negotiate priorities and resource distribution.
In this context it is important to address
urban issues alongside rural rehabilitation
and development.
Urban management is one of the twelve
pillars of the National Development Plan of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
Increasingly the Afghan government is turning
its attention to urban reconstruction and
development and donors are beginning to
respond to these challenges in a far more
concerted manner. A critical focus is on the
supply of infrastructure. Important though
this is, unless urban management is effective
and governance systems are sound,
investments in physical development will not
be sustainable or evenly spread. To this end
it is important that clarity is achieved over
the functional responsibilities of different
levels of government and government
departments. This in turn necessarily
prefigures effective revenue generation and
expenditure at and for the local level, as
well as the implementation of evolving
policies, plans and practices that emerge out
of the post-war political and development
context.
In Afghanistan as elsewhere, cities are host
to competing interests, many of which
command excessive power. As in any post-
war context, such interests are inextricably
linked to the scramble for the spoils of
reconstruction, often at the expense of
weaker and more vulnerable urban dwellers.
4 UNDESA, op cit.; Government of Afghanistan (GoA). National Priority Programmes – the National Urban Programme. Kabul,
May 2004. Available online: www.afghanistangov.org/npp (accessed on 12th August 2004).
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5 See for example: ACF (Action Contre la Faim). Kabul Vulnerability Mapping. Kabul: ACF. January 2004; Alden Wily, L. Land
Rights in Crisis. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. March 2003; d'Hellencourt, N. et al. Preliminary Study
of Land Tenure Related Issues in Urban Afghanistan with Special Reference to Kabul City. Kabul: UN Habitat. March 2003;
Grace, J. 100 Households in Kabul: A Study of Winter Vulnerability. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.
August 2003; Hunte, P. Some Notes on the Livelihoods of the Urban Poor in Kabul, Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research
and Evaluation Unit. February 2004; Schuette, S. Urban Vulnerability in Afghanistan: Case Studies from Three Cities. Kabul:
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. May 2004; Stigter, E. “IDP families in Herat City, Afghanistan – Displacement
histories and intra-household decision-making with regard to departure, stay and return.” Forthcoming in International
Migration Review. 2004; World Bank. Poverty, vulnerability and social protection in Afghanistan. Washington, D.C.: Human
Development Unit South Asia Region. May 2004 (draft).
6 Nevertheless, this was ultimately a small study and data are illustrative and indicative rather than allowing for generalisation.
7 The interview guide for household- and community-level interviews can be found in Appendix C.
8 ACF, op cit.
Critical to the present investigation and to
post-war conflict management are the
conditions, opportunities and challenges that
face ordinary urban citizens in Afghanistan.
Also central to this analysis is how the
institutions operating in and on cities pay
attention to including vulnerable urban
dwellers in access to resources and decision-
making.
1.2  Study methodology
The research for this study was built primarily
on qualitative data gathering techniques,
notably structured and semi-structured
interviews, observations and some focus group
discussions. This methodological approach
was appropriate given the size of the study,
which did not allow for investigation of the
extent of urban issues, challenges and
opportunities so much as their nature, as
well as how they were understood by different
groups of urban actors. The research has
been situated and contextualised through
reference to and review of reports from
earlier studies, policy documents and one or
two surveys.5 The authors were able to
capture the perspectives of a wide range of
respondents and interlocutors from local and
national government departments,
international development agencies and
advisory organisations, local NGOs, as well
as urban residents and their representatives.
Findings and perspectives from different
groups of informants and across the three
cities were systematically triangulated.
These were integrated into the three key
arenas of investigation: urban governance,
urban management and vulnerability, as
represented in Figure 1.6
A total of 84 semi-structured interviews were
conducted with informants from Afghan
ministries, municipalities, international
development agencies and local and
international NGOs involved in urban
programmes and projects. Informants were
identified through initial advice and a process
of snowball sampling. The final interview
guide is provided in Appendix A, while the
complete list of respondents is provided in
Appendix B. Semi-structured interviews were
also employed when talking to members of
urban households and communities across
Kabul, Mazar and Herat.7 Every effort was
made to ensure the voices of both men and
women were heard as well as those of both
the elders and younger members of a
particular community. Respondents were
asked to describe their personal situation
and the challenges they faced that were
associated with urban life. These included
movement and mobility, livelihoods and
income generation, access to housing and
services, security and safety, the nature of
social networks and social cohesion, contact
with governmental and municipal and
institutions, and local representation...........
Choice of neighbourhoods was deliberate and
informed by survey data,8 consultation with
the Ministry of Urban Development and
Housing (MUDH), UN-Habitat and CARE
International. Houses were chosen from a
number of streets that together appeared to
represent the full range of residents in a
settlement. Decisions were informed by taking
into account the quality and size of housing,
its design, location and distance from
amenities and the settlement centre. Houses
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)8
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were then randomly picked and their residents
asked for an interview. Contrary to prior
advice and the practice of studies conducted
in similar environments elsewhere, the
researchers chose not to consult with local
authorities, community organisations or
neighbourhood representatives in advance
of arrival in the neighbourhood, in order to
avoid bias. Nevertheless, their presence was
soon noted and if further consultation was
required return visits were arranged with the
wakil-e gozar (appointed neighbourhood
representative) or other community leaders.
In Kabul interviews were conducted in Districts
1 (11), 3 and 13 (7),9 16 (11) and 17 (9). In
Mazar, the research team interviewed
residents in Districts 2 (5), 7 (4) and 10 (4).
Finally, in Herat interviews were conducted
in Districts 6 (5), 7 (2) and 9 (5). The
distribution and the location of interview
areas are visualised in Appendix D.
The methodology was also designed to
facilitate a reporting approach whereby
informants were allowed to speak for
themselves, through the use of quotations
when views expressed represent widely held
opinions in a particular place or among a
particular group. Short illustrative case studies
were also compiled and are presented as
boxed text. Those on urban Afghanistan derive
from the research and information gathered
during household level and key informant
interviews. Lastly, drawing on the authors’
own experience, international case studies
are also included where challenges and policy
responses are of special relevance to
Afghanistan.
Figure 1. Methodology: triangulation of primary and secondary data collection
9 The district boundaries were partially overlapping; however the characteristics of both neighbourhoods investigated were
similar in terms of location (hillside), income (low), ethnicity (predominantly Tajik), and migration history (urban).
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The more than two decades of conflict that
began in the late 1970s in Afghanistan gave
rise to urban destruction and social
fragmentation on an unprecedented scale.
Displacement, the disintegration of
communities and the destruction of trust and
systems of support were all consequences of
the war years.
Security continues to preoccupy many people
in Afghan cities.10 Interestingly, however, it
was not perceived as the primary urban
challenge faced by many of the poorest urban
dwellers interviewed for this study. A blind
man interviewed in Mazar put it like this:
I make a bit of money assisting people
in the municipality, but all of my children
are beggars. So the only thing that’s good
here is security — we have nothing so
thieves don’t come here, because they
know there is nothing they could
steal....We have to move to another
house soon because the owner wants
more money. This house has no
electricity, no water, no toilet — how
can anyone live here? The war is over,
but also in peace surviving is difficult.
Indeed, discussions with people living in
Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat showed that
while respondents acknowledged the crucial
role of security from violence for enhancing
economic and social development, more
immediate concerns prevailed. These were
sustainable shelter solutions as well as the
provision of basic services such as water,
sewerage, and waste collection. The demand
for housing and services is reflective of
dramatic population increase and
concentration in and around Afghanistan’s
main urban centres, including the three study
cities.
Currently, 23.3 percent of Afghanistan’s
population is estimated to live in urban
agglomerations although some sources see
this as an underestimate, putting the
proportion of urban dwellers closer to 30
percent. Projected annual changes in
“percentage urban” (1.98—2.34 percent for
Afghanistan) are above regional averages
(1.16—1.42 percent for Asia).11 This
development is put down to three trends:
self-generated growth (urban natural
increase);12 net in-migration fuelled by
economic scarcity, unemployment and
environmental hazards (mainly droughts) in
rural areas;13 as well as refugee return flows
(both assisted and spontaneous). Respondents
from the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) as well as international
agencies and NGOs dealing with refugees and
IDPs, such as the International Organization
for Migration (IOM), emphasised that refugees
and IDPs returned to their villages of origin.
However, the qualitative evidence suggests
that due to a lack of livelihood and other
opportunities in the countryside, a significant
number of assisted returnees immediately
left the countryside for the city. This implies
that Afghanistan’s urban population may be
underestimated, constituting an important
area of further research.
A male English teacher who lived with his
two brothers and their families in Kabul
District 17 illustrated the incentives for urban
settlement:
We live in here because it is close to
Parwan where we are from originally.
Still, we are not planning to go back to
Parwan due to the risk of droughts and
floods. We also chose to live in Kabul
because here we have a school for our
children and better job opportunities.
2.  The Urban Context in Contemporary Afghanistan
10 The situation may have been exacerbated by heightened security problems associated with the pre-election period, during
the summer of 2004, when the field research for this paper was conducted.
11 UNDESA, op cit., 26,103.
12 That is, urban births exceeding urban deaths.
13 Urban in-migration exceeding urban out-migration.
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Similarly, a father of six in Herat District 6
explained:
It is two months that we have been living
in this district; originally we are from
Pushton Zarghon, a village in Herat
Province...I had been going back and
forth for years because there were no
jobs in Pushton Zarghon. We used to work
in agriculture, but because there was a
shortage of water we had bad harvests.
Now we are renting this house for 2,000
Afghanis [US$40] per month. We live here
with 12 people, but fortunately started
building a new
house for which we
had bought the
land before we
came from the
village.
S u c h  a c c o u n t s
represent the history and experience of many
Afghans. They also indicate how rural and
urban vulnerability and livelihood systems
are crucially intertwined in patterns that are
dynamic and connected rather than
disconnected and fixed. A humanitarian aid
specialist suggested that “in Afghanistan,
disaster drives urban growth.”14 The findings
of this study suggest that it also drives the
agency, resilience and self-help strategies of
v u l n e r a b l e  p e o p l e .  T h u s ,  t h e
recommendations are concerned to point to
ways of facilitating and supporting their
efforts rather than undermining or exploiting
them.
2.1  Kabul — capital city challenges
Kabul is by far the largest city in the country
and one of the fastest growing cities in the
region. The population is estimated to have
increased from around two million in 2001
to around 3.5 million people today.15 This is
unprecedented in recent history, even when
compared to fast-growing cities such as Dhaka,
Lagos, Karachi, Jakarta, or Mumbai.16  It was
estimated by a number of key informant
interviewees that over 60 percent of people
live in “informal” areas, with many under
constant threat of eviction due to insecurity
of tenure. This might be because they do not
possess title deeds or because steadily rising
rents lead landlords to seek better-off tenants
or members of their own families to occupy
their houses.
Planning for such a fast-changing urban
environment is clearly a challenge. The master
plan for Kabul was
developed in the mid-
1970s and approved in
1978. It caters for a
city of 700,000 people
rather than 3.5 million
and has now been
officially suspended
through a presidential decree.17 However,
its legacy remains on the walls and in the
heads of many planners and implementers.
Neighbourhoods within the city are still
classified as “formal” or “informal” according
to the parameters of the master plan, with
the effect that infrastructure provision, such
as a citywide water project funded by a
bilateral donor, neglects the most needy
areas. Adherence to the master plan and the
tendency to only recognise development
within it has allowed political factions and
elites who control access to opportunities
within the master plan area to determine
the direction of urban development in Kabul.
Kabul Municipality has the status of a ministry
and reports directly to the president.
However, it has recently lost all authority to
approve plans to the MUDH. This has caused
a great deal of frustration among municipal
bureaucrats. They argue that they themselves
should be in charge of the city and have
demanded a massive increase in funding in
14 Personal communication in April 2004. See also UN-Habitat, op cit., 4.
15 Hunte, op cit. and ACF, op cit.
16 Growth rates in these cities vary between 6.17 and 3.13 percent; UNDESA, op cit., 8.
17 Personal communication, UN-Habitat Kabul, July 2004.
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Adherence to the master plan and the tendency to
only recognise development within it has allowed
political factions and elites who control access to
opportunities within the master plan area to
determine the direction of urban development in
Kabul.
order to develop neighbourhood by
neighbourhood. In this they would be guided
by the old master plan or, as they argue, a
new plan that has yet to be developed.
Private investment exists but is largely
unrestricted by municipal regulation.
Construction rules and regulations are not
enforced. This suggests that government
institutions will have to gradually build up
the capacity to provide incentives, and
coordinate and regulate initiatives by non-
governmental actors. The need for flexible
approaches as well as cooperation and
coordinat ion between government
departments and between government and
residents is particularly acute in the context
of land administration and housing, where
local commanders, some allegedly with the
backing of central government, have been
involved in large land grabbing operations in
the west and the north of the city.
None of this is helpful to Kabul’s vulnerable
citizens. Provision of safe drinking water,
sanitation systems and sewage canals were
the services that respondents in all Kabul
districts prioritised over alternatives such as
electricity, education, and even the creation
of  more susta inable  employment
opportunities. For instance, in some districts
water has become a commodity and its
purchase absorbs a large proportion of the
incomes of low-income households. Privately
owned tankers currently provide it, with
residents paying around 60 Afghanis
(approximately US$1.20) per drum. As a
shopkeeper in District 17 said:
The water tanker comes every four days.
They aren’t from the government; rich
people own them. You can see some
modern houses around here [points
toward some large construction sites and
a recently finished two-story building
nearby]; these are the houses of the
people who own the water tankers. They
earn 1500 Afs [US$30] per day and tanker.
Housing and service delivery shortages have
attracted considerable attention from
international donors and agencies, and a
number of projects have been initiated and
completed during the past three years. They
have included projects for water and
sanitation rehabilitation and projects helping
the city’s residents cope with health risks
and a volatile employment situation.
However, donors and NGOs alike complain
about the low degree of coordination among
themselves with regard to reconstruction,
upgrading and service provision. The extent
to which the National Urban Programme,
developed with assistance from UN-Habitat,
can achieve this goal remains to be seen.18
2.2  Mazar-i-Sharif — provincial
capital and service centre
Mazar-i-Sharif (hereafter Mazar) is a
commercial centre that serves as a hub for
small and larger traders, with a population
between 500,000 and 700,000 inhabitants.19
The master plan for Mazar is based on 16,000
families, yet because of insecurity and
unemployment in the surrounding rural areas,
current informal estimates suggest a city of
up to 80,000 families, including IDPs and
labour migrants who commute between
countryside and city. Hence, as with Kabul,
the master plan bears little relationship to
the urban reality of Mazar. Displacement has
given rise to an above-average representation
of a nomadic group (Kuchis) who live mainly
in two of the ten districts making up the city.
Profoundly vulnerable, they co-exist with
local communities but have no formal or
informal relationship with them. Employment
opportunities in the city are nevertheless
limited. Although once a thriving centre of
productive activities no factories remain, as
entrepreneurs left the country, dismantling
their plants and production sites in the face
18 GoA, National Priority Programmes, op cit.
19 The Afghanistan Information Management Service places Mazar’s population at around half a million residents, but several
others, included those interviewed for this study, stated that 700,000 was a more likely estimate.
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of the Soviet invasion and subsequent
hostilities. What was left was destroyed during
the Taliban regime. Likewise, ongoing
insecurity as a result of commander activity
stands as a disincentive to economic
investment. As a result, it is generally believed
that about half the population is unemployed,
although reliable statistics are not available.
Contrary to Kabul with its large numbers of
peacekeepers, the potential for an outbreak
of large-scale violence
is significantly higher
in Mazar where there
is less oversight and
where the city is
characterised as a
regional centre with
two competing commanders. One of them,
Atta Mohammed, has recently become the
provincial governor, a move apparently
approved by the other, Rashid Dostum, who
stood in the recent presidential elections and
secured 10 percent of the overall vote.
Although they have developed a modus
operandi between them, the security situation
remains tense, with occasional clashes
between factions working with or alongside
these two or other local military commanders.
Such conflicts affect urban life not only by
restricting freedom of movement but also in
rising prices for basic foodstuffs every time
there is an outbreak of violence. Land
grabbing in Mazar is also more concentrated
than in the capital city. At the time of the
research a large area just outside the city
centre was in the news. Here a local
commander was in dispute with 498 claimants
over a piece of land he occupied during the
war against the Taliban in late 2001. Across
the city it is estimated that about 90 percent
of property development is in private hands
and totally unregulated.20 Respondents
expressed frustration over the lack of
bureaucratic accountability and the high
levels of corruption in the city.
Atta Mohammed, along with his close ally,
the mayor, has failed to ensure significant
investment in municipal service provision, so
that it is even worse in Mazar than in Kabul.
The municipality has only a limited number
of engineers, administrators and planners,
all of whom operate without resources. Due
to budget limitations the number of workers
is equally constrained; for example, municipal
waste collectors were reduced from 150 ten
years ago to 60 today. During this time the
urban population has
nearly tripled.21 A
Mazar shopkeeper from
District 10 reported
that:
The waste collectors
from the municipality
come here once per month and take away
the litter, but they would have to come
more often — every ten days or so. But
because they don’t ask us, they don’t
know that we want them to come here
more often.
A young woman in Mazar explained further
the impact of poor service delivery on ordinary
people:
There is nobody to collect the waste of
this neighbourhood. Only when there is
electricity there is water, otherwise
water stops. I don’t know why. We have
electricity but it is not reliable; during
winter we use gas and wood for heating.
UN-Habitat introduced into Mazar a waste
collection system known as “the Karachi
System.” Based on experience elsewhere in
Asia the system involves community
contracting of a micro-entrepreneur to engage
in house-to-house waste collection and street
cleaning, leaving secondary waste collection
and removal to the municipality. However,
when the funding ceased, this was not
sustained. This is indicative of a widely held
20 Personal communication, Eng. Radyar, UN-Habitat Mazar, July 2004.
21 Ibid.
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Contrary to Kabul with its large numbers of
peacekeepers, the potential for an outbreak of
large-scale violence is significantly higher in Mazar
where there is less oversight and where the city is
characterised as a regional centre with two
competing commanders.
attitude among local officials in Mazar that
in the absence of resources from the centre,
investment in urban infrastructure and
services should be the responsibility of
international donors. It is difficult to discern
why this might be. One possible explanation
is that certain donors have circumvented
efforts at donor coordination in the urban
sector and have made individual approaches
to the municipality in Mazar, for instance in
relation to road construction. Another
explanation is the very success of earlier
donor-funded initiatives in the city and
possible resentment at the withdrawal of
funding, for example in relation to the
community development councils or the
Karachi system of primary waste collection.
Another explanation might relate to relations
between the centre and Mazar and the fact
that any surplus generated locally is required
to be transmitted to Kabul, with little
returning from the centre.
2.3 Herat — the “Dubai of
Afghanistan”
The third city analysed in this study in Herat.
It is the main Afghan border city with Iran
and Turkmenistan and a bustling provincial
centre. It is a key entry point into the country
and straddles important trade routes, as well
as being the country’s most active border
point in terms of trade interactions. As a key
entry point for imported and exported goods
— crucial to consider in the context of national
revitalisation — customs revenues are
estimated at US$1 million a day. Cross-border
flows are not restricted to goods and many
of the massive influx of returning refugees
from Iran right after the fall of the Taliban
came through Herat. Although this has now
almost reached a halt, according to informants
working with refugee populations, thousands
of people still pour into Herat during the
winter from the two neighbouring countries
in order to find shelter, food and employment.
Foreign, local and returnee investment into
communications, transport and property is
remarkable. There are now more than 25
industrial plants in the greater urban area,
mainly producing cement and textiles. The
mayor at the time of the study, a visionary
and close ally of the suspended former
governor, Ismail Khan, exhibited a clear focus
on grand projects in line with his long-term
vision of Herat as “the Dubai of Afghanistan”.
This he hopes to achieve through investment
in income-generating initiatives that will
render municipal finances more sustainable,
for example, wedding halls, hotels and other
premises for rent. The municipal bureaucracy
functions comparatively well. Here it is helped
by a strong regional resource base. For a city
roughly the same size of Mazar, the number
of municipal staff — about 700 plus 400 day
 labourers — is impressive, made possible by
the fact that the city, under Khan’s reign,
did not submit any significant resources to
the centre.
Relative to other Afghan cities the physical
infrastructure of Herat is extremely good,
with asphalted roads and increasingly reliable
electricity from Iran and Turkmenistan serving
the better-off neighbourhoods. The public
transportation system works well, assisted
by donations from the Indian government and
Iran. With the help of donors and the
provincial government, the municipality has
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purchased a dozen well-maintained second-
hand vehicles for solid waste collection from
Germany. However, the emphasis is on
secondary collection and cleaning of main
roads, commercial centres and better off
neighbourhoods. Lower-income areas and
less influential communities remain under-
serviced. For instance, an unemployed male
respondent in District 6 explained:
Waste is piling up and the streets are
dirty, but the municipality does not do
any work in this area; the centre is so
beautiful but they don’t pay attention
to District 6 where the poor live! We also
have nothing to do with the shura; they
don’t listen to us. There is a wakil but
we don’t have any communication with
him because he does not work.
Despite major achievements with regard to
service provision, services such as education,
health and water are not yet adequate to
cope with present growth. The same holds
true for housing, in particular in the outskirts
but also in the centre where housing prices
have risen substantially over the last two
years.22 If urban investment and growth are
reaching the vulnerable citizens of Herat it
is only slowly. To the extent that poverty is
being addressed, this is through confining
vulnerable groups to the villages and to
peripheral settlements surrounding Herat
City (see Box 1).
The municipality has rehabilitated parks in
an attempt to create public spaces and
emphasises a policy of including and
protecting women in public life and discourse,
yet both women’s rights groups and human
rights activists reported abuses and
intimidations backed by local authorities.
Another area of concern underlined by several
respondents was severely restrained freedom
of expression. There has been a particularly
arm’s length relationship between Herat City
and Province and the centre that saw various
episodes of brinkmanship between Kabul and
the former governor. It remains to be seen
the extent to which the formerly tight link
between local bureaucracy and the provincial
authority under Ismail Khan will loosen under
the new governorship of Sayed Mohammad
Khairkhah. It also remains to be seen whether
the latter will be able to better encourage
powerful interests in Herat towards a wider
process of nation-building, for example
through more assiduous resource flows from
the city towards the centre and vice versa.
Local–central power relations are likely to
remain tense until the local political situation
is stable, while the city’s future cannot be
considered without taking into account
regional geo-politics, particularly in relation
to Iran.
22 See, for example, Schuette, op cit. and Stigter, op cit.
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Box 1: Vulnerability on the urban periphery: examples from Herat District 9
Herat is rightly lauded as the most livable city in Afghanistan due to the rapid speed of reconstruction
financed by both local and international capital. However, some of the city’s areas continue to harbor
poverty and social exclusion. District 9, located in the southwest of the city, is a mixed area with modern
dwellings and mud houses next to each other. The street that leads to the district is not asphalted, even
though promises have been made recently that the municipality would act on this issue, a decision mainly
informed by the district’s glorious history as the place where the jihad against the Soviet occupants
broke out.
Malika (name changed) had moved to her new house from Islam Qala (on the border between Iran and
Afghanistan) only two days before being interviewed in July. As a response to the Soviet retaliation to
insurgency operations in this area, her family had migrated to Iran and stayed there for 14 years. After what
Malika called “Ismail Khan’s victory against the occupation” they came back to Herat in the mid-1990s. Yet
during the reign of the Taliban, the family decided to again flee to Iran. The Taliban then martyred her
husband on the Herat—Kandahar road in 1999 after he had joined a mujaheddin commander earlier that
year. Now they have come to Herat “because we had no shelter in Iran anymore. The Iranian government
forced us to leave.”
The widow and her four children lived in a small mud brick house with three rooms, constructed on top of
the leftovers from another building. The rent for this place with no windows, no water, no electricity and
no sanitation was 700 Afghanis [US$15], but Malika did not know whether she would be able to pay this
much. She hoped to make some money with tailoring and doing the laundry for neighbours, which could
earn her about 20—30 Afs [US$0.40—0.60] per day. In Iran she was doing some carpet weaving, but her
fingers began to hurt, her eyes got weaker, and she was increasingly unable to concentrate. Her oldest son
was 14; he used to work part-time in a tailoring shop, making the equivalent of 15 Afs [US$0.35] per garment.
He had yet to find better employment in Herat. If it turned out that she could not pay the rent, then Malika
said, “We will have to move into one of the ruins because we have no other alternative.”
Malika herself had five brothers and three sisters. Three of her brothers had been jailed under the Taliban;
two of them were now drivers travelling the road between Kabul and Herat. “They don’t help us because
they are poor themselves,” said Malika. “But we hope they will invite us to their houses sometime so we
can eat together.” Malika was also very concerned about the health of her children. Her daughter’s nose
was often bleeding. Before she arrived in Herat Malika went to the hospital in Mashad. The doctor told her
to come back after two months, “but now I am here and I cannot go back to Mashad. So I went to the clinic
in Herat yesterday, but it wasn’t of any use. They refused to treat my daughter when I said I couldn’t pay.
I wish I had a good life again with my husband,” she said, “but everything was destroyed when he died.”
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)16
Issues Paper Series
3.1 The physical and social impact
of conflict
More than two decades of war have left a
daunting footprint on Afghanistan’s cities. In
Kabul, 63,000 private homes were ravaged
by fighting and about 60 percent of its roads
destroyed.23 Mazar-i-Sharif suffered less
physical destruction but certain groups of
citizens suffered particularly badly. Herat
was heavily affected during the early 1980s
when the mujaheddin insurgency forces
started their activity on its outskirts; its road
networks are in need of reconstruction, and
basic services have not been extended to all
districts.24 To varying degrees, in each of
the cit ies the provision of urban
infrastructure, housing and services poses an
important challenge in reconstruction and
the demands being made on local authorities
in this regard are enormous.
Few countries can claim a history of forced
migration that would be comparable to that
of Afghanistan. Some respondents living in
Kabul Districts 1 and 3 had moved up to seven
times in five years, across both rural and
urban settlements. Armed conflicts in both
cities and rural provinces have led to
displacement and disintegration of a society
in which local networks have conventionally
been the backbone and guarantee of
individual security and social support.
However, an unemployed male refugee in
Herat District 6 stated:
I know only one of my neighbours here;
he is a relative. I cannot rely on the
3.  Urban Development and the Legacies of War
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23 GoA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2.
24 See, for example, World Bank, op cit.
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community; I just try to solve my
problems myself.
Even though family ties remain strong, despite
(and some might argue as a result of) two
decades of armed struggle, the capacity of
local safety nets and networks of reciprocity
to provide social security has undeniably
suffered. Some refugees and IDPs have
developed elaborate coping mechanisms,
sometimes spanning provincial and even
national borders. However, there are many
urban dwellers with few connections on whom
they can rely, with widows and nomadic
communities being the most particularly
vulnerable individuals and groups
respectively.25
Recognition of continuing urbanisation and
the resulting pressure on existing urban
systems has to be at the centre of any viable
reconstruction strategy. A growing budget
for urban development and an increasing
number of infrastructure projects indicates
this is the case. Nonetheless, complex
problems require comprehensive and well-
coordinated solutions that tackle social and
institutional issues alongside the physical
challenges of reconstruction. A male
household head in Kabul District 17 illustrated
the juxtaposed impact of physical destruction,
lack of employment opportunities and
migration when he said:
We are originally from the Guldara part
of Shomali and have been living here for
almost two years. When we came back
from Pakistan, where we had been staying
for four years during the Taliban era, we
found our home and lands and gardens
in our village destroyed. Nothing
remained. We came back to Afghanistan
because we did not have any good income
in Pakistan. We were also having problems
with the heat. A lot of people in Pakistan
told us there would be work in Kabul,
now that there was peace in our country.
Yet I haven’t seen any work opportunities
here, so I had to open this shop, next to
our house. We have built this house
ourselves after receiving permission from
the local commander.
Many had experienced physical destruction
as a main driver of migration. Said a father
of five in Kabul District 17:
We are originally from Shomali, but we
have been living here for almost three
years now. We had been in Iran before
for six years, where I was working as a
daily labourer. With the peace in our
country we decided to come back to
Afghanistan. We wanted to go to our own
place in Shomali but found it destroyed.
Nothing remained. Therefore we decided
to rent a house. Now we are living here,
but the rent is rising steadily.
However, it was not only those who were
displaced who suffered from the physical
destruction and social dislocation of war. A
male respondent living with his family in
Herat District 7 related the experience of his
family:
We have always been living here. This is
the place where the jihad against the
Soviets started. They destroyed
everything here, so most people fled,
but we were too poor to go anywhere
else — so we stayed. Now we have this
place and we actually have a title deed
for it. We are lucky, in a sense.
Those who own houses or have title deeds
were not necessarily better off than tenants
but they were at least relieved of one source
of vulnerability. As a result of rising rents,
tenants sometimes reported that they
reconstructed parts of a house in return for
the temporary right to stay. A 40-year-old
woman whose husband had died 14 years ago
and who lived in a destroyed building in Kabul
District 1 explained:
25 The social experience of returning refugees and IDPs is elaborated upon in Section 4.1 on land and security of tenure.
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Our own house was completely destroyed
during the war so we moved into this
house. The owner of this house lives in
Karte Naw. He is not asking us for the
rent; he is a kind man to us. We also
reconstructed some parts ourselves.
Other residents in the same neighbourhood
were less fortunate: “I had not been paying
money but one month ago the owner came
and asked me to pay 400 Afs [US$8]” said a
42-year-old woman who was living in a
destroyed building protected by plastic covers.
“We had our own private house in this location
but during the last war it was burnt.”
Respondents to the field research frequently
stated as their single most important
challenge the need for a place to stay that
was well serviced and recognised by the local
authorities. However, informal dwellings now
constitute the bulk of Afghanistan’s urban
housing stock and many people interviewed
expressed doubt as to whether municipalities
and the central government would be in the
position to provide them with safe, secure
and affordable l iving and working
environments. A male respondent from Mazar
District 7 speaking for a group of eleven Kuchi
nomads said:
You know, we have nothing to do with
the government people, we are not giving
anything to the government and the
government has never done anything for
us except for vaccinating our children...
We don’t feel close to the government;
we have had nothing in 35 years and we
will never have anything. The only thing
we really want from the government is
electricity and nothing else! All we need
is electricity.
Service priorities varied. Of particular concern
to female respondents was health care. Said
a 45-year-old mother of four children, one
of them chronically ill, who lived in Kabul
District 17:
There is neither a clinic nor any hospital
near to where we live, and I have to take
my daughter far away to the city centre,
where I have to pay 50 Afs [US$1] to
receive advice and treatment for her.
Sometimes I have to wait for hours.
Unavailability of medical services is
undeniably a more severe problem in rural
areas. However, research suggests that for
many migrants to the city, urban in-migration
might increase proximity but it does not
necessarily improve access to health services,
something that should remain a priority in
urban areas.
Education did not arouse much attention
among older interviewees, especially men.
However, younger male respondents regularly
emphasised their desire to continue schooling.
Their experience of education was often one
of years of interrupted study and patchy
attendance in different locations. An 18-year-
old male respondent in Kabul District 17
pointed out:
Our income is just enough for us and we
cannot save anything for our future.
However, if the situation in our country
gets better in terms of security and
education I am going to finish my
schooling, and then I am going to study
at the university.
Female respondents were more reticent about
discussing educational opportunities but
eagerly discussed the acquisition of additional
skills. Most sought training in weaving, sewing
and office work.
A comprehensive urban development strategy
requires addressing the challenges of physical
reconstruction and development alongside
recognition of social and other services, as
well as the social support networks that
characterise the daily struggle of ordinary
Afghans. This is critical to strengthening the
trust between those who govern and those
who are governed and in improving the
responsiveness of government to urban
citizens, as well as the effectiveness of urban
interventions.
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3.2 The political and bureaucratic
inheritance
Important in understanding the urban political
landscape in Afghanistan is to recognise that
it includes people and institutions acting both
in and on the city. In other words, political
alliances and economic partnerships do not
only include actors within cities themselves.
Supra-urban political and economic arenas,
whether at the provincial, national or even
regional level can be influential in determining
urban politics and can have consequences
for urban development. There are many
people poised to take advantage of the
opportunities presented by reconstruction
and development, and some with sufficient
influence or leverage to do so. Rapid
urbanisation, the physical legacy of war,
rising land prices and inflated rents have
given rise to a variety of actors with
competing interests that share common goals.
These are often antithetical to the needs or
aspirations of vulnerable urban dwellers.
Hence cities in Afghanistan as elsewhere are
sites in which political and economic power
are constantly being sought, maintained and
defended.
Official or bureaucratic institutions also
include those acting in the city, namely
municipalities, as well as national level
government departments acting on the city.
Competing interests are pertinent here as
well, with different government organisations
seeking to increase or maintain their influence
and assert their competence over city
management. Such goals are undermined in
a number of ways.
• First, the influence and expertise of all
government departments tends to be
eroded by dated approaches to planning,
alongside practices and procedures that
are inappropriate to the demands of
contemporary Afghan cities.
• Second, official influence is compromised
by the need to constantly struggle to
reconcile limited resources with the
yawning need for investment in urban
development in the wake of war.
• Third, in post-war Afghanistan urban
bureaucracies have suffered from a
relative lack of attention and resources
when compared to the kind of investment
offered in the form of humanitarian aid
and for rural rehabilitation and
development.
• Fourth, lines of responsibility in relation
to departmental and organisational
responsibilities are not sufficiently clear.
While sub-national government in
Afghanistan and its relationship with the
centre is clear on paper it is often opaque
in practice.
• Fifth, a great deal of information is kept
outside the public domain and there is
insufficient information sharing and
transparency on the part of municipalities
and other organisations involved in urban
development.
One of the greatest challenges facing the
urban sector in Afghanistan is the lack of
communication, coordination and cooperation
between the different organisations and
institutions involved in urban development
and governance. The formal or official division
of labour between the policy and planning
functions of national government and the
management functions of municipalities is
not evident in practice. In terms of
governance, there are few effective structures
linking the wealth of locally generated
information and experience to the level of
urban planners and policymakers. In theory,
socially embedded institutions for community
management and local governance such as
the shuras should constitute the conduit,
either directly or through the loya jirga. In
practice this rarely happens. Hence, a priority
for government and donor agencies is to
foster communication and cooperation
between the various actors operating in and
on urban development and between these
agencies and representatives of a wide range
of community interests. This is a prerequisite
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for more coordinated urban management and
effective urban governance. With these
political and bureaucratic constraints in mind,
the following sections cast light on the areas
of government impinging on urban
development.
3.3  Municipalities and urban 
management
Afghanistan is a unitary state with ultimate
political authority vested with the central
government in Kabul. However, municipalities
are de jure self-sustaining autonomous bodies,
responsible for providing services and
collecting revenues from local taxes, fees,
licenses, rents and proceeds from sale of
properties.26 Article Six of the Municipal Law
states that Kabul Municipality is part of the
national government. Each province has a
provincial municipality (sharwali wolayat),
which in principle constitutes a separate level
of government, with provincial municipalities
being part of local (provincial) administration
under the overall control of the Ministry of
the Interior (MoI).
Towns and cities function within the limited
mandate provided by the 1964 Constitution
and more recently under Article 141 of the
2004 Constitution,27 which states that:
To administer city affairs, municipalities
shall be established. The mayor and
members of municipal councils shall be
elected through free, general, secret and
direct elections.
This is in line with government commitment
to install democratically elected governments
at the national and local levels. The legislative
framework for municipal government is the
Islamic Emirate (Government) of Afghanistan,
Ministry of Justice, Decree No. 29, 1369
(1990) amended in 1379 (2000).28 In addition,
the Electoral Law for Municipalities was
passed in 2003 in order to manage the
electoral affairs of the municipalities and
their districts. According to this law, mayors,
members of municipal councils and district
associations are to be elected for a term of
three years, with the mayor being elected
indirectly from among municipal council
members on the basis of a secret ballot.29
Municipalities are largely self-sustaining
financial entities in that all revenues belong
to the municipality (see Table 2). As such
they are the only government entities outside
of central government with some measure
of fiscal autonomy. However, municipal
revenue collection is regulated by the Ministry
of Finance (MoF) and rates for all taxes and
fees collected are set in Kabul. Both ordinary
(operational) and development expenditures
are based on revenues collected by the
municipality, with 45 percent of municipal
revenues meant to fund the ordinary or
operational budget and 55 percent the
development budget.30 In reality in the cities
covered by this study almost all revenue was
taken up with the ordinary budget.
A range of local revenues finance municipal
budgets. Potential revenues are significant
and include, for example, the safayi (a service
charge and property tax), a rental tax (Kabul
Municipality takes the equivalent of one
month’s rent per year), other property and
business taxes, license and other fees and
fines. In Herat various innovations have been
introduced to swell the municipal coffers and
promote municipal financial sustainability,
for example, investment in the construction
of wedding halls and hotels to generate
municipal revenues. By contrast, in Mazar,
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 21
Shaping Urban Futures: Challenges to Governing and Managing Afghan Cities
31 Adapted from Evans et al., op cit.,10.
32 Ibid, 7-9.
33 GoA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 5.
little effort has been made to engage in
revenue  enhancement  measures .
Municipalities, while having some limited
autonomy in budget preparation and
execution, are dependent on the MoI for
approval of the budget and staffing
establishments32 and in Mazar complaints
focused on this oversight function of the MoI.
Despite the relative autonomy of municipal
finance and the potential for revenue
generation at the local level, resource
constraints prevail. Demand on resources also
grows as urbanisation increases and
municipalities appear unable to provide
adequate infrastructure and services to their
residents within existing means. Investment
from central government or other sources
cannot be ruled out, particularly for cities
that are less able to generate significant
revenue. Nevertheless, rates and taxes require
review. For example the last time properties
were valued for the safayi was in 1978 and
the highest property tax currently paid is
equivalent to US$4 per annum.33 In addition,
not all municipalities have an equivalent
resource base and few are able to enforce
sanctions in relation to non-payment.
In provincial cities municipal expenditure
requires the approval of the provincial governor
and provincial governors exercise informal
control over municipalities and municipal
finances. This study’s research suggests that
there was some confusion on the part of a
number of interviewees about the boundary
between municipal and provincial finances
and fiscal relations and greater clarity is
necessary not only in the rule books but in
day-to-day practice.
There is also a need for greater clarity on the
functions and responsibilities of municipalities.
Chapter Four, Article 16 of the Municipal Law
of 1379 (2000)  l i sts  wide-ranging
responsibilities and competencies of
municipalities. These relate to infrastructure
development, including for example:
construction of physical facilities such as
canals and ditches, public latrines and
bathhouses; and construction and maintenance
of public roads, markets, commercial, cultural
and civic centres (see Table 3).
Some of these functions are recognisable as
crucial municipal responsibilities, for example,
environmental protection and public health
and land and property management. When
Structure
The municipal
structure (departments
and numbers of staff)
is set by the MoI with
the agreement of the
provincial governor
Table 2. Formal municipal relations in Afghanistan31
Administrative Arrangements Fiscal Arrangements
Personnel
The appointment of
junior staff is approved
by the governor,
middle ranking staff by
the relevant minister,
while senior staff are
appointed by the
president
Revenue
All tax and fee rates
are set in Kabul.
However, municipal
revenues are collected
and remain in the
municipality and fund
all municipal
expenditures
Expenditure
The “ordinary” (or
operational) and
development
budgetary allocations
for the municipality are
processed by the
municipality and
approved by the MoI
with agreement of the
governor
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viewed comparatively, other responsibilities
listed are competencies less commonly
devolved to the municipal level. Whether or
not this is the case it is clear that the range
of responsibilities is extensive. Moreover, in
cooperation with other government line
ministries, municipalities can also become
indirectly involved in the construction of
sewerage and water supply systems, housing,
energy supply, communications, public health,
education and sports facilities, usually in an
implementing role. Capacity at the local level
is insufficient to rise to the challenge of such
wide-ranging responsibilities.
There is a tension between the de jure
oversight of municipalities and municipal
mayors by the MoI and the de facto autonomy
of many activities and actors at the local
level. Provincial municipalities require
approval from the MoI, via the governor, not
only for their budget but also their
organisational structure and tashkeel (staffing
establishment of approved posts). This is a
point of contestation between Kabul and the
larger provincial municipalities. Herat, for
example, is not only relatively self-sufficient
but itself oversees surrounding rural
municipalities “even to the extent that all
revenues are often turned over to the
provincial municipality, which in turn pays
all expenses.”34 Although the municipalities
in the five largest secondary cities are
expected to implement infrastructure, land
and housing programmes in collaboration
with line ministries, capacity is variable and
34 GoA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future,108.
Table 3. Sample responsibilities of municipalities
Service delivery • Public health and environmental protection,
notably sanitation and sewage treatment
and solid waste management
• Street lighting and planting greenery
• Provision and maintenance of parks and
recreational amenities
• Assisting in the maintenance of law and
order
Planning activities • Implementation of master plans
• Management of land and buildings
• Distribution of plots for residential and
commercial purposes
• Expropriation of land for development
• Prevention of informal buildings
Revenue generation and management • Collection of revenues from municipal
properties and taxes from shops, markets
and residential buildings
• Complaints and redressal
• Setting and controlling prices
• Licensing
• Data collection
• Providing legal support
Governance • Promoting public involvement in city services
• Strengthening capacity in society
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there is competition over roles and
responsibilities between them.
Thus far the discussion has related by and
large to provincial cities. As the capital and
primate city of Afghanistan, Kabul Municipality
constitutes a special case. Article Six of the
Municipal Law clearly states that Kabul is
part of the national government. It has much
greater autonomy than the provincial
municipalities and its mayor has ministerial
status. Without the involvement of the MoI
the mayor of Kabul and senior staff are
appointed directly by the president and the
budget is approved not by the MoI but the
MoF. Kabul Municipality has greater capacity
than other municipalities and indeed is
expected to implement upgrading projects,
the construction of roads, canals and drains
and solid waste management programmes
using guidelines from the relevant line
ministry. It is precisely its anomalous position
with the status of a “ministry” that sometimes
puts Kabul Municipality in competition with
line ministries also responsible for urban
development.
Overlapping responsibilities, competition
between agencies operating in the urban
environment and poor communication and
information flows to ordinary citizens
increases urban vulnerability. There was a
significant degree of confusion among
respondents about where to turn to in order
to address service delivery shortcomings. For
example, in Kabul the fact that the Central
Authority for Water Supply and Sewerage
(CAWSS), which is part of the MUDH, is
responsible for water provision and sewage
systems (and not the municipality) was largely
unknown. One recently arrived refugee in
Bagh Ali Mardan in Kabul said:
After arriving here I went to the
municipality to submit the documents to
get a tap in my house. I even paid them
some money, but they have not done
anything so far.
Another example from a hillside community
in Kabul District 17 saw residents approached
by “officials” [they did not know which
ministry these men were working for] and
asked to pay 1,000 Afs [US$20] so that cables
for electricity could be provided. Two months
later electricity was only available to a few
residents at the foot of the hill. A second
approach was made, this time for 2,000 Afs
[US$40], “to extend the cable network to
higher levels.” The informant who recounted
this incident was unable to afford the payment
at that time and eventually ended up buying
a generator.
There is something of a gap between the
legislation governing the roles and
responsibilities of municipalities and the
realities of urban management on the ground.
There is also some considerable variety from
one urban centre to the next. Much depends
on both adherence to and interpretation of
the Municipal Law, the resources at the
disposal of or utilised by local authorities,
and the extent to which these are
supplemented by funds from the centre
(apparently rarely) or provincial coffers
(seemingly significantly in the case of Herat).
3.4  National government and 
urban policy and planning
The vision for the urban sector as articulated
in the National Development Framework
(Physical Reconstruction and Natural
Resources) is to:
• Invest in a balanced urban development
programme across the country to create
viable cities that are hubs of economic
activity, and organically linked to rural
areas; and
• Develop urban areas in a balanced manner
through housing and infrastructure
investments, thereby reducing over-
crowding, improving access to basic
services and generating employment and
economic growth.
A number of government line ministries also
have responsibilities for urban policy and
planning. These include the MUDH, the MoI
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)24
Issues Paper Series
35 Ibid, 5.
36 The issue of land is taken up in more detail in Section 4.
(which controls municipal administration and
traffic management, except in Kabul), CAWSS,
the Ministry of Transportation (MoT) and the
Department of Public Works. Confirmed in
interviews and as pointed out in the Technical
Annex on Urban Development of Securing
Afghanistan’s Future: “Functional
responsibilities and roles remain unclear or
inappropriate and, as a result, there is a lack
of appropriate urban policy.”35 This was
unequivocally confirmed by the present
research.
An urban policy is beginning to take shape
through the development of the National
Urban Programme (NUP). The NUP is
ambitious in scope and was conceived largely
in Kabul. A number of interviewees outside
the capital had not heard of the NUP although
this may be because it was only beginning to
come together in June 2004, not long before
research for the study took place. The NUP
also constitutes an attempt to provide a
framework for informing the wide range of
ongoing urban activities and initiatives at the
community or neighbourhood level that are
largely uncoordinated and without clear
direction from the centre. The NUP has six
priority sub-programmes to achieve its
strategy of sustainable, secure, prosperous
and inclusive urban centres in Afghanistan.
These are focused on areas such as
governance, land, urban revitalisation and
infrastructure.
The NUP is clearer in terms of its goals than
in guidance as to how its sub-programmes
might realistically and practically be
implemented. Moreover, a number of
constraints exist that relate to the current
management structure of the urban sector
that threaten to retard the admirable
intentions for the urban sector contained in
the combined vision of the National
Development Framework and the NUP.
While municipalities are primarily responsible
for implementation of the policies and plans
of line ministries operating in the urban
sector, the following are the somewhat
contradictory responsibilities of the MUDH:
• Formulation and implementation of urban
development policy;
• Development of master plans;
• Development of rules for the preparation
and implementation of urban projects for
the construction of industrial and civil
buildings;
• Improvement and control of quality of
construction;
• Construction supervision;
• Renovation of public buildings; and
• Construction of public buildings through
its construction enterprise.
There is also potential confusion over land
registration, which is implemented by a
number of agencies. For example,
municipalities distribute land and maintain
records for tax purposes, but the registration
of ownership has to be formalised by the
Supreme Court or District Courts, depending
on the case, as well as the national surveying
and mapping agency (Afghanistan Geodesy
and Cartographic Head Office) that historically
has undertaken cadastral mapping.36
An expatriate engineer engaged in urban
reconstruction in Kabul spelt out the
implications of poor communication and
coordination for day-to-day delivery:
We do not have sufficient staff in the
ministries and municipalities. The main
obstacle is coordination and cooperation.
In Kabul I encounter a problem with the
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municipality not wanting to cooperate
with those agencies that have to solve
several problems inside the city like
water, electricity and telephones. They
are blocking each other through lack of
knowing who is responsible for what and
they are not able to share responsibility
and it makes it really complicated. They
do not compete but just ignore each
other and if they cannot decide who does
what, things just stop unless someone
from above solves the problem.
The national government’s move towards the
development of a cohesive urban policy is
further put at risk by financial constraints
within the urban sector and the need for
greater strategic control to ensure policy
cohesiveness. The central government in
Kabul attempts to centralise locally generated
funds but in fact there is de facto decentrali-
sation. In the provincial municipalities studied,
it was clear that local governors retained
considerable autonomy over local revenue
collection and expenditure and that city
mayors were more certain of resource flows
from this quarter than from Kabul.
The pace of urban growth, institutional
weakness and limited financial and human
resource capacity all suggest that a flexible
and partnership-oriented approach to city
management is required. However, this
represents relatively new thinking in the
context of Afghanistan where bureaucrats
exhibit a strong desire for central steering
and a fixation on the order and certainty
provided by master planning. Master planning
rarely keeps up with the spontaneous growth
of cities and has given way to strategic
approaches to development and planning
that is consultative and communicative. In
Afghanistan, however, disillusionment with
political structures and factionalism after
more than two decades of fighting has left
professionals suspicious of participatory
processes and with a preference for technical
solutions. While understandable, this is
problematic in terms of moving towards an
urban development strategy based on
partnership rather than state delivery.
3.5  The role of international
development agencies
The vision for the urban sector in Afghanistan
is being taken forward with significant support
from international agencies. Several donors
and implementing organisations are currently
involved in urban issues and capacity building:
the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA), the World Bank, the
European Commission, UN-Habitat, the
governments of the United States, Japan,
Sweden and Switzerland, the German
Development Bank, international and regional
organisations (such as the Aga Khan
Development Network, Aga Khan Foundation,
CARE, Afghan Civil Society Forum, Bangladesh
Rural Advancement Committee and Caritas
Germany), as well as local organisations such
as the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Unit and a number of others engaged in
construction and engineering projects. So far
there is no institutional framework for project
coordination among these different actors,
apart from the Urban Management
Consultative Group (UMCG), which is a critical
arena for coordinating and harmonising work
in the sector. Working groups on more specific
urban issues have been proposed but not yet
implemented. This is a matter of some
urgency, as coordination of the international
actors and sequencing of their activities, in
concert with Afghan sector specialists, is a
priority.
Despite a discussion forum for the urban
sector there is still a tendency for some
agencies to simply get clearance from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and get on with
their own projects. This may well be because
of problems within the MUDH and its
functioning. But for urban development to
be effective and sustainable, coordination
of the urban sector has to be reclaimed for
the ministry. One urban professional
interviewed reported a senior official in the
urban sector saying the following in a meeting
with a donor agency:
Listen, understanding is the precondition
for ownership. I do not understand what
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you are talking about. You need to explain
things better if you want us to have
ownership.
A prerequisite for understanding and
ownership is information and this needs to
be shared.
Members of the international organisations
mentioned above were as likely to express
concern over coordination and information
sharing as staff of municipalities and the
MUDH. A critical issue in this regard is
communication and here the UMCG, among
others, can play an important facilitative
role. Better communication among urban
actors may also help to address political
resentment on the part of Afghans over donors
spending the bulk of resources on setting up
their own programmes rather than investing
in Afghan reconstruction. It would also prevent
such bitterness spilling over into technical
debates, for example, over planning priorities
and sequencing or ways of visioning the city.
Some tension was also evident between NGOs
on the one hand, and donor agencies, private
companies and consultants working with the
MUDH and municipalities on the other. An
engineer illustrated this through an example
of water supply in Mazar-i-Sharif:
In Mazar we have over 400 hand pumps
installed and in the network just some
wells but there is no control over them,
no maintenance, no water quality
checking which should be the
responsibility of the municipality but it
is not there.  It is some kind of emergency
measure but a dangerous one in a water
scarce c ity  because they lack
understanding. They leave it to NGOs
and even they do not obey international
standards and regulations. So even if
they are doing good it is out of control
and no one feels responsibility for it and
all the tools for maintenance and
operation and control are completely
missing.
In the end, it is the everyday citizen that
suffers. The resentment of ordinary people
towards development processes over which
they have little understanding and less control
can be seen through the words of a father of
three in Mazar-i-Sharif, District 7 who said:
We are really angry at all these foreign
NGOs that have come here; they conduct
lots of surveys but nothing happens.
There are more NGOs than people in
Afghanistan. They should either work
harder or close their offices and go back
to their home country and stay with their
families.
One reason that NGOs in particular are seen
not to be delivering effective urban services
is that although located in the cities, their
work is often targeted at rural areas.
However, the security situation has prevented
many NGOs from being able to leave their
headquarters in the cities and some have
turned to providing support to low-income
urban settlements. Yet being relatively new
to the urban field, they sometimes lack the
expertise to coordinate their activities with
other urban agencies and effectively represent
and serve vulnerable communities.
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3.6  Socially embedded institutions
The term “socially embedded institutions”37
is used to refer both to social networks of
support such as among families and kin or
neighbours and friends, as well as cooperative
and collective activities undertaken towards
providing community-level management of
urban infrastructure and services in the
absence of government provision. Elsewhere
a wide range of social and associational sites
have been harnessed in the interests of
development programmes, or relied upon in
the absence of them. In Afghanistan too there
is increasing interest in the developmental
potential of social networks and community-
llevel organisation for urban management
and local governance.
Despite the commonly held view that kinship
networks, reciprocity and community-level
risk pooling are eroded by urbanisation and
less evident in urban areas, it has been shown
more recently that this is not necessarily the
case and cooperation is alive and well in
many cities of developing countries.38
However, this occurs where there is something
to share or to organise around in the first
place. In the wake of war this is not always
the case and heightened vulnerability and
insecurity can erode this potential. Prior
research in Afghanistan,39 as well as the
findings of this study, show that urban social
networks have become severely fractured by
hostilities and the displacement of people.
3.6.1 Reciprocal relations and networks of
support
Outside of formal organisational structures,
people at the street and community level
only occasionally team up to pool resources.
Residents were found to have very limited
resources and were reluctant to see demands
made upon them. As one community elder
in Herat District 6 stated:
We have limited communication among
each other. When we talk, we talk about
problems — but we cannot help each
other because we are all poor.
A 25-year-old woman in Herat District 7 said:
We have some contact with our
neighbours. When we have problems such
as borrowing dishes and using them for
a night, then they help us. But, you know,
everyone here is poor. Whenever there
is a bigger problem like crime or
sanitation, then we turn to the wakil and
he appeals to governmental offices, but
I haven’t seen any results so far.
Increased social fragmentation is a cause for
serious concern. Vulnerability leaves little
room for largesse. Statements such as “some
family members live here as well, but they
are too poor to help us” are as common and
alarming as the widespread disintegration of
gozar or neighbourhood level social structures.
Declining mutuality was a particular problem
in Kabul where it appears to be a product of
both forced and voluntary in-migration and
the resulting diversity of settlements...........
While some respondents reported occasional
discussion and even collaboration with their
neighbours, many also said they didn’t know
anyone else in their street. One man living
in District 3 said, “Yes, we do have neighbors
around us and they are looking like good
people to us, but we don’t have any specific
relationships with them.” He went on to say
that once the neighborhood got together to
do some street cleaning because the trucks
from the municipality never came “but you
can’t say that we talk or help each other on
a regular basis.” Another woman in Kabul
District 16 lamented:
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We are not in touch with anyone here
and we have no one who supports us. We
also haven’t sat together with other
families to make a joint decision. I don’t
talk to our neighbours regularly because
the men in my family would not like that.
There’s no one to trust. Only our men
can go to some places to complain. I don’t
know these places; maybe my husband
knows better. Ask him.
As a response to the attrition of mutual
support and an increasing dependence on the
urban cash economy, residents often turn to
shopkeepers to borrow money, although the
preferred means of support remained the
(extended) family. This is the case even when
kin are widely scattered, as appears common.
3.6.2 Community-level collective action
Conflict-induced migration and social
fragmentation not only left urban dwellers
without close and trusted social contacts but
also deprived them of political access. Vertical
connections between government officials
and residents were mixed. Respondents’
comments suggest a widespread perception
that links with government entities are almost
entirely absent. Access to local decision-
making structures remains blocked for those
lacking wasita (political connections and
leverage). Wasita tended to rest with the
male elders. In Kabul, where the majority of
male respondents said they trusted their
wakil-e-gozar (neighbourhood “advocate”
formally representing a certain number of
families), female respondents regularly
demanded more say in local decision-making
processes.
The capacity of wakil-e-gozars (wakils) or
kalantars40 and the local shuras — community-
level groups of elders often linked to local
religious bodies such as the mosque — to
solve problems was acknowledged as
important. However, they were also signalled
as problematic. Several respondents
complained about the self-interest and
ineptitude of their representatives. Said one
man in Kabul District 16: “In case of problems
with water or electricity we should go to the
wakil, yet he just listens to people but doesn’t
do anything about it.” Although a number of
elders did seek benefits on behalf of their
communities, others did not. Moreover, many
residents did not perceive them to be
legitimate representatives, either because
they made no visible effort on behalf of their
communities or because their interventions
had little impact. Critics were often younger
men or women. Said one adolescent male
respondent in Kabul District 17:
The wakil is responsible for this area. He
recently collected money from most of
the houses saying he would try to bring
us electricity, but so far we have not
seen anything happening except having
some cables in some of the streets, for
some of the houses.
Almost all female respondents felt that their
concerns were not listened and responded
to by the wakils. A 14-year-old girl in Herat
District 9 explained:
I think it’s a problem to be poor and to
be a woman. You see, the men team up
in the mosque and they have a shura
boss, but the girls and women are not
allowed to be members of the shura.
A female teacher and the oldest of three
wives in the same Herat district complained:
We have a shura here but women are not
allowed to become members so they
cannot defend their rights. The men can
do what they want. The women are also
not allowed to contact the municipality.
Another woman, a mother of three in Herat
District 6, confirmed this view:
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There is a shura but just the men can
decide, not the women. Actually, there
is not a single female member in the
shura...The men who are shura members
do nothing for the area, nor have we
received any service from the
municipality.
In Kabul District 17 a mother of four illustrated
how neglect on the part of elders is not simply
benign but prevents collective action on the
part of women wanting to help themselves:
Once all the neighbours got together to
go to the municipality because we had
no water and no electricity, but the wakil
did not support us...We also don’t have
any proper sanitation system and our
toilets are in bad condition. Yet, because
the wakil said we wouldn’t achieve
anything by talking to the municipality
we did not go. The problem is, we can
only turn to our wakil or to our elders
to help us, but nothing is happening.
Newly arrived respondents also said they felt
“disconnected,” sometimes underlining that
the wakil would refuse to speak out on their
behalf. A mother of seven in Herat District
9 complained:
We moved here more than a year ago,
but we have no relationship with the
neighbours. Neither they come to us nor
we go to them. We cannot rely on the
community at all. The wakil of the gozar
is the person to whom we could tell our
problems to but he does nothing. There
is a shura but they are only there for the
rich people.
The role of the shuras as legitimate
representative institutions, while deeply
entrenched, is increasingly questioned given
their  lack of  connectedness  and
representation of poor individuals, vulnerable
groups such as ethnic minorities or recent
arrivals in their areas, and women. To a
limited extent, alternative grassroots civil
society organisations (CSOs) have emerged
in some urban areas and are challenging old
ways of doing things. They have been nurtured
by international organisations but many
operate under funding constraints. All CSOs
risk interference on the part of local
authorities and provincial leaders.
Furthermore, there is a tendency in urban
settlements for communities to be encouraged
to support particular political factions or
leaders en masse and this potential exists as
much for CSOs as for shuras.
It is important not to over-romanticise the
role of community organisations. Social
networks and local-level organisations are
frequently embedded in asymmetrical social
relationships. Often engagement with politics
or government bureaucracies means that
existing hierarchies or inequalities simply get
reinforced. This is confirmed by the
effectiveness with which less vulnerable urban
citizens are able to organise themselves in
relation to urban management and
governance. For this reason people in poor
urban communities often assign a high value
on external agents and it is in this role that
intervention by donors and NGOs can be
particularly useful.
3.6.3 Corruption and connections
Corruption was found to be an area of serious
concern in the context of service provision.
Respondents in the household-level interviews
in Kabul mentioned that they had gone to
Kabul Municipality and had been asked to
pay for a particular service (e.g. for their
names to be put on the land distribution list,
for the provision of water and electricity,
upgrading of the sewage system). Payments
can reach up to 7,000 Afghanis (US$145).
However, having paid, they then never hear
back from the municipality, nor have they
received any land or service. It is suspected
that public officials use the payments to
support their admittedly meagre income
(between US$35 and US$100 per month). A
male Pashtun respondent in Kabul District 17
said:
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I have not gone to the municipality for
help yet because I know that the muni-
cipality is not going to listen to us, because
we are poor people and we don’t have
any type of recommendation or money.
A respondent in Kabul District 16 made
a very similar statement:
Cemet Khana [where he lives with his
family] does not have any public
transportation lines, so we are using the
Macrorayan or Qala-e-Zaman Khan lines.
I have gone to the municipality several
times, but so far there has been no
response. Without paying them money
or showing recommendations from
influential people you cannot tell them
anything.
Nonetheless, the types of corruption described
above are particularly worrisome, for three
reasons. First, they undermine the already
weak confidence of residents in the system
of urban management. Indeed, both female
and male respondents repeatedly pointed
Box 2: An example of intra-district inequalities: Hazaras in Mazar District 10
Mazar-i-Sharif’s tenth district, southwest of the city centre, is both ethnically and spatially divided in two.
A Pashtun father of three who lived in the district explained: “This area is divided into two parts, one part
where the Sunnis live and the other where the Shi’ites dwell. It is like a desert there and looks quite scary!
I wouldn’t go there.”
Ariana is indeed inhabited mostly by Sunni Muslims, the majority living in middle and upper-middle class
households, with formally constructed houses, shops and workshops close by. Ahle Chapan, on the contrary,
is made up almost entirely of Hazara households, many involved in carpentry and brick making. Here one-
storied mud houses dominate the architectural landscape. Ahle Chapan is located further away from the
main paved road and sources of transport. It can only be reached by crossing one of two small concrete
bridges. Cars are virtually absent; donkey carts are the main means of transportation. The already weak
mobile phone reception dies out shortly after crossing the creek that divides the two neighbourhoods.
The task of conducting comparable interviews in the two areas immediately became a challenge when
residents of Ahle Chapan expressed anxiety, saying they did not want to be interviewed. Less than a minute
after approaching them an armed guard rushed towards the group, asking what the three researchers
wanted. He subsequently explained that due to recurrent attacks on residents and a recent case of murder
some men were now patrolling the dust roads by foot to “protect” the approximately 800 families.
A widow was tearful when relating the devastation to her family and their assets as a result of the conflict
with the Taliban. Her disadvantage was compounded by her exclusion from local-level assets and structures.
The male head of the local education centre, located in Ariana, explained: “The Sunnis who live in this
neighbourhood are richer than the Hazaras of Ahle Chapan. The reason for this is the Taliban regime’s
cruelties; they suppressed them and also killed a lot of them.” He also pointed to significant differences
in service delivery and quality:
We have a Karachi system here, but over there in Ahle Chapan people are too poor to pay the collectors,
so no one goes there and does the job. The same with sanitation: they don’t have any contacts in the
municipality and cannot pay for private collection of night soil, so they end up having lots of hygiene
problems.
One of the key themes of this study is illustrated by this example from Mazar: even though social cooperation
or cohesion can reduce certain risks, it cannot substitute for investment in basic services or replace private
or collective financial assets. The head teacher emphasised:
Here in Ariana the situation is better than in Ahle Chapan. But this doesn’t mean that we don’t have
any issues. For example, we were promised by the local community organisation that they would dig
a deeper well but nothing has been done. So in the end we rely on what we earn ourselves to make
things happen.
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out that the “municipality people [such as
workers, waste collectors or tax collectors]
have never come to this neighbourhood.”
Moreover, there are no provisions within
institutions of government to establish
mechanisms for dealing with residents’
concerns, complaints and suggestions. Second,
corruption reduces the prospects for
establishing sound taxation systems, thus
significantly depleting the municipal resource
base. Lastly and significantly, corruption
reduces the asset base of already vulnerable
people.
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4.1 Insecurity of tenure,
affordable housing and urban
land management
Millions of people in developing countries
live without adequate security of tenure or
property rights. The problem is particularly
acute in urban areas where the costs of access
to legal land and housing are high and rising
faster than incomes. This is very much the
case in urban Afghanistan, which has seen
housing destroyed through decades of war,
as well as high rates of urbanisation as the
conflict abated, through refugees and IDPs
coming into the cities. In Afghanistan, as in
other developing countries, this has led to
housing shortages and high land prices and
rentals, while leaving local authorities
overwhelmed by the demand for land, services
and housing. Strict building standards and
regulations deriving from the days of master
planning,  as  wel l  as  burdensome
administrative procedures based on ideal
norms rather than the realities of local
circumstances, have made inevitable a rise
in informal construction, even among middle-
income urban dwellers, as people help
themselves in the absence of alternatives.
Informal settlements are estimated to house
between 30—60 percent of the population of
cities in developing countries and in the short
term at least, regularisation policies are
widely recognised as the only realistic solution
to improving the housing conditions of the
urban poor.41 This is increasingly the case
for urban Afghanistan as well, although there
is still considerable resistance to the
recognition, regularisation and servicing of
informal settlements. Wariness is
understandable given that people do not
always construct homes in areas that are
suitable for servicing. The hillside settlements
of Kabul are good examples of the challenges
posed for Kabul Municipality and government
departments concerned with extending
services. Nevertheless, the concentration of
urban settlements also offers opportunity,
given the lower per capita costs of
infrastructure development and services when
physical conditions are hospitable.
Problems in accessing affordable shelter and
insecurity of tenure were found to be
immediate sources of vulnerability among
many of the people interviewed. High rents
were prevalent across all three cities. In the
capital city, a diminished housing stock
alongside the influx of returnees, IDPs and
the arrival of expatriate development workers
has meant that the availability of
accommodation is squeezed at every level.
This has exerted both an upward and
downward pressure on rents, which has a
devastating impact.
In terms of urban vulnerability the qualitative
evidence suggests that a distinction needs
to be made between those who own and
those who rent. Both may face financial
pressures but the latter also run the risk of
“forced mobility”.42  A male household head
in Kabul District 17 recalled his experience:
I have been living here for almost six
years. Before that, we were living in
Panjshir in our own village, but due to
the flooding of our village we lost
everything, including our land, home and
gardens. Therefore we had to move into
this house...The prices have been going
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41 Durand-Lasserve, A. and V. Clerc. Regularization and Integration of Irregular Settlements: Lessons from Experience. Urban
Mangement Programme Working Paper Series No. 6. Nairobi: UNDP/UNHCS/World Bank-UMP. 1996.
42 See Alden Wily, L. Land Rights in Crisis. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. March 2003 and d’Hellencourt
et al., op cit.
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up during the past two and three years.
Now, we would not be able to buy
property anymore.
A 32-year-old woman from the same district
further illustrated the situation:
This is a rented house for which we pay
3,000 Afs [US$60]. Before we came here
a couple of months ago we lived in Baraki,
also in a house that we were renting.
The Taliban had burnt down our own
house in Shomali. We moved to this one
because the house owner of our former
place had asked us for an advance
payment which we could not afford.
A 50-year-old father of seven, living in the
destroyed city centre (District 1) expressed
his anxiety that he might end up without
shelter for his family:
Every day the owner of this house is
coming and asking me to move out, but
what should I do? I just can’t afford to
pay him anymore, but you know how
difficult it is to find an affordable place
for nine people.
Kabul Municipality provides little assistance
with regard to shelter provision. Several
respondents reported visits to Kabul
Municipality to put their name on a list of
future beneficiaries of land distribution, but
so far to no avail. In some cases, applicants
were told that they would have to pay a fee
for this “service”, which some could not
meet. Financial constraints are exacerbated
by the lack of income opportunities. Quite a
few returnees and newly arrived Kabul
residents found their hopes of a decent job
disappointed. A young father of four in
Kabul said:
As you know, during the past two years
lots of people have come back to
Afghanistan, therefore there is no work
opportunity. I try making money at the
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bazaar, but the chances there are quite
bleak as well because people can also
hire Pakistanis who come from the
borderland. It’s not just Afghans at the
bazaar!
In the meantime people are getting on with
building homes informally and repairing
houses destroyed in the war, whether their
own, those of their landlords or on land
belonging to people who have not yet
returned.
A critical consideration in making choices
about housing is security of tenure. This is
regarded by UN-Habitat as a fundamental
requirement for the progressive integration
of the urban poor into city life and a basic
component of housing rights.43 Three issues
complicate the right to housing in urban
areas. First, land and housing are not just
shelter but are valuable assets and subject
to the vagaries of both formal and informal
land and housing markets. This can stand in
the way of efforts to address housing poverty,
particularly under conditions of housing
scarcity as in urban Afghanistan. Second,
most countries have cultural and religious
practices that intersect with statutory land
law, which influence access to land and
tenure security. For example, ownership of
land and rules of inheritance often restrict
equitable access on the part of women, as
is the case in Afghanistan. Third, in many
developing countries, multifaceted land
management systems are complicated by the
absence of land records, corruption associated
with housing allocation, and the operation
of both legal and illicit land markets. This
further skews access to land and insecurity
of tenure.
In conflict cities such as in Afghanistan, access
to land and security of tenure are exacerbated
by the legacy of war and ongoing social
tension. In addition to problems that might
have existed in the past — such as land
shortages, inadequate access to infrastructure
and services, or the concentration of land in
the hands of a privileged elite — additional
insecurities and inequalities arise. These
include damaged or destroyed houses, giving
rise to housing shortages and land disputes
due to lost or traded land records leading to
multiple claims. Many urban residents who
left the cities during decades of war could
not access the land or homes they used to
own on their return. IDPs who fled the
countryside for the relative safety of urban
centres and settled in abandoned houses,
war-affected structures or informal
settlements now face chronic uncertainty in
terms of their tenure security. This is
exacerbated by: escalating disorder created
through wrongful occupation, land grabbing,
the production of illegal land titling
documents, the uncontrollable tactics of
private developers, confusion over land
administration systems and planning
procedures and no clear land policy. A strong
argument has been made for putting land
issues on the public agenda and to use the
Constitution as a vehicle for establishing
general principles of property rights and land
tenure security.44
The absence of an effective and coherent
land management system in growing cities
such as Kabul, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif has
provided room for illicit dealings whether by
politicians, government officials, private
militias or unscrupulous land developers. In
addition to insecurity of tenure for the urban
poor, ineffective land management means
reduced land revenue for the city, civic
disengagement from urban governance, a
deteriorating urban environment for urban
dwellers, and the potential for social unrest.
Under such conditions urban land clearly
requires special and urgent management.
43 Kajumulo Tibaijuka, A. “A Message from the Executive Director UN-Habitat.” Habitat Debate. 9(4): 2.
44 Alden Wily, L. Land and the Constitution: Current Land Issues in Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Unit. November 2003.
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45 For a fuller discussion of land policy, planning and management in Afghanistan see Alden Wily, Land Rights in Crisis, op
cit.
46 Ibid, 23-25.
47 For a detailed study of urban land tenure see d’Hellencourt, et al., op cit.
4.1.1 Land management systems and
dispute resolution
Urban land policy and administration in
Afghanistan needs to be placed in historical
context. Inequities in land distribution have
been reinforced over time by misdirected
policies that in turn have helped fuel conflict
over land, which cannot be disassociated
from decades of war and political violence.45
Even prior to the war years land management
was complicated in Afghanistan by several
legal regimes being applicable, including
customary law (rawaj), civil law (qanoon
madani), religious law (Shariat or Shar’ia)
and statutory or national state law. Shariat
is largely embodied in civil law in the form
of the Civil Code of Afghanistan, a compilation
of Islamic law texts that constitutes the main
handbook of all courts of law in Afghanistan.
It comprises 2,416 articles and as many as
1,000 of these are relevant to land matters.
Customary law sometimes departs from
Shariat and the Civil Code and all are
applicable only where state law does not
apply. Frequent regime change in Afghanistan
over the last century has had a confusing
impact on state law and has given rise to 60
or more different land laws and
amendments.46 It is worth noting the formal
institutional processes governing land
administration. These are dealt with at length
elsewhere and are covered in less detail
here.47  At the same time it is important to
recognise that informal institutions and
practices often predominate in urban land
management and this report points to a
number of examples illustrating this............
Formal land administration is carried out in
Afghanistan by the following organisations:
• The Cadastral Survey Department;
• The Land Office (Imlak);
• Municipalities;
• Primary courts; and
• The Special Property Disputes Resolution
Court.
Yet the responsibilities of these organisations
are often confusing and overlapping, therefore
much of land administration remains informal.
More on these organisations is provided below.
The Cadastral Survey Department
The Cadastral Survey Department is
responsible for organising land surveys, land
settlement and land registration affairs. The
Ministry of Finance in collaboration with
USAID established the department in 1963.
The intention was to categorise and manage
landed property for taxation purposes. In
1965 land was surveyed in Kabul and eight
other provinces, expanding into further
provinces at a later date. Today the Cadastral
Survey Department is located in Kabul, with
16 Regional Directorates in Kabul, Kandahar,
Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar, Parwan, Kapisa,
Ghazni, Helmand, Farah, Faryab, Jawzjan,
Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan and Paktia.
Based on cadastral survey law, land ownership
is distributed as follows:
• Private land (arazi shakhsi) (agricultural
and gardens);
• Government land (arazi dawlati)
(agricultural and gardens);
• Government barren land (arazi lamazro
dawlati);
• Residential areas (sahaat-e-maskoni);
• Industrial and professional works (kasaba
kari wa sanati);
• Pasturelands (alafture); and
• Forests (jangalaat).
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The cadastral maps and documents were
widely used in the course of the first and
second rounds of land distribution during the
1978 land reform process.  Large parcels of
land were sub-divided and ownership
transferred, changing completely the
cadastral maps, documents and registration
system with the Land Office. However,
changes were made on blueprint copies with
the original standard maps being left
untouched. Two decades of conflict saw the
destruction of documents held in the
provincial Cadastral Survey Regional
Directorates, leaving as the only source the
Cadastral Survey main archive in Kabul.
However, these are in relatively good
condition and possibly can be used for land
titling purposes, although this does not appear
to be automatic practice.
The Land Office (Imlak)
Imlak is an independent office that was set
up and supervised directly by the Ministry of
Finance. During the 1978 land reform it came
under the Ministry of Agriculture and Land
Reform and remains under the (now) Ministry
of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry.
However, today it deals with land registration
in both urban and rural areas. Transfer and
registration procedures are intricate and
exacting.
Kabul Municipality
Kabul Municipality has responsibility for land
acquisition and distribution in the city, being
the relevant public juridical entity according
to the Land Acquisition Law (LAL), Official
Gazette, Issue No. 794, 1421HQ (1379 HS),
(2000 AC). Land acquisition is the
responsibility of the Municipality’s Property
Department, which comprises two
directorates, Acquisition and Technical and
Cost Estimation. Working in collaboration
with the Cadastral Department the Acquisition
Directorate prepares property plans both for
government and private properties and
facilitates the issuing of title deeds. According
to existing municipal law, male citizens
reaching the age of majority have the right
to a housing plot or apartment provided
certain steps and criteria are followed. The
documents issued by the municipality are
valid for three years and the owner is not
authorised to sell or mortgage the plot until
receiving the title deed. This is forthcoming
once the owner has completed at least 40
percent of the construction. If this does not
occur the land returns to the government.
This regulation, which is widely known among
Afghan citizens, is one of the reasons for the
boom observed in the context of micro-level
and small construction projects in provincial
centres. Even though those who build do not
necessarily possess a title deed, respondents
to the household-level interviews frequently
expressed the expectation that “the
government” would be unable to evict them
and destroy the buildings once they had
erected and completed a significant share of
the overall project.
Primary Courts
Primary courts undertake the registration of
land. Both buyer and seller together confirm
the location of the property and officially
request the transfer of title deeds. A court
order is obtained on the basis of a circular
form being filled out by the Imlak, the
municipality, the revenue office of the
Finance Department, the Water and
Electricity Departments and the Microrayon
Maintenance Department. The buyer and
seller each provide two copies of a recent
photograph and two persons as witnesses.
These persons go before a judge, who
endorses the payment of a deed tax to the
bank, after which the title deed is transferred
to the buyer.
The Special Property Disputes Resolution
Court (SPDRC)
The SPDRC was established in 2002 and is
accountable to the Afghan Supreme Court.
In September 2003 President Karzai decided
to divide it into two parts: the central court
for Kabul and the provincial court for the
rest of the country. The impetus for the
SPDRC was a sharp increase in the number
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 37
Shaping Urban Futures: Challenges to Governing and Managing Afghan Cities
of returning refugees and IDPs and resultant
property dispute cases arising out of multiple
land claims and squatting. They work in liaison
with the responsible local courts and the
Supreme Court, which also delegates cases
to the SPDRC. At the time of the study, it
appeared that only 113 cases had been dealt
with since the provincial chamber was
established, and only two cases solved.
Although the number of cases is small it
should be noted that the number of claimants
affected could be quite high. For example,
in Mazar-i-Sharif, one case involves nearly
500 claimants. The case argued that a Junbesh
field commander and his soldiers had moved
in and forced local people off land allocated
to them by the municipality.
The chairman of the provincial court explained
that there are two ways in which disputes
are resolved. In the case of overwhelming
evidence, there is a straightforward winner
and loser. The chairman indicated that in his
40 years of experience, in 80—90 percent of
cases, the claimant won. If the situation is
less clear, the elders of the area in question
are invited to a group meeting. If no clear
solution can be found, the court tries to
facilitate compensatory measures through
the land-occupying party making a payment
to the benefit of the losers. As the chairman
explained: “Our goal is to bring about peaceful
arrangements. We are judges, we are
responsible for people’s property but also
for ensuring functioning relationships between
government, society and business.” However,
an interviewee from an NGO concerned with
land restitution cases said of the SPDRC:
It is functioning in Kabul but not very
well or not at all outside Kabul. And it
does not deal with IDPs. Also it does not
cover disputes if one side is the
government. If there is a case where the
government is one of the parties the case
will be addressed in the regular courts.
So the latter are dealing with a lot of
the cases that should go to the special
court. If the problem is with the
municipality — which is a government
department — you have to go to the
municipality itself for redress.
This interviewee went on to say that even
when a court or municipal order was obtained
it was difficult to enforce: “The police will
not necessarily enforce it. There are other
people telling them not to enforce it. A lot
of our work is going to the police or the
Ministry of the Interior over such matters.”.....
4.1.2 Constraints to systems of land
management
The official system of land acquisition,
transfer and registration, and dispute
resolution described above, though complex,
is well documented and understood. However,
a number of factors work against its effective
operation and development. There are
historical and contemporary forces at work.
Over the years land legislation has been
successively overruled. For example, during
the Communist era, private property was
appropriated and although compensated this
was at less than the market rate. Mujaheddin
leaders also appropriated property during
the 1980s and 1990s, rarely compensating
the owners. During the Taliban regime,
between 1996 and 2001, both government
authorities and armed commanders took
private property by force. Land and houses
were transferred many times over by way of
forged title deeds in which the Land Office
was complicit, and made available through
the primary courts. In recent years the
problem has increased further, with growing
examples of the occupation of private and
government properties by armed commanders
and government officials that have been
widely reported in the media.48
A generally held view was that despite
confusion over competing legal frameworks
and the difficulty in obtaining land titles,
the real problems were associated with
48 Bashir Malik [no date]. Report on Land Administration (mimeo).
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implementation of the law or lack of it. One
informant stated that “we can get Karzai to
issue decrees about this land, or that project,
and those beneficiaries, but it is a guideline
not a rule book in the end.” A government
employee explained things this way: “The
problems do not come from a lack of laws as
some say. It is the misuse of the existing
laws. People just grab the land, and then
the laws are not applied.” Another
government official went further:
If you want to obtain a title deed for a
piece of land that you legally possess,
what you have to do is pay at least
US$3,000. Then you might get a duplicate
if you are lucky. Seventeen thousand
documents still have to be entered into
the computer system, so there is plenty
of opportunity for additional incomes.
Yet corruption cannot be crushed because
the government is so weak. You need a
lot of coordination to do something
against it. The wars have destroyed our
political and social cohesion.
Consequently, the issues of urban land rights
and security of tenure for the urban poor are
severely affected by problems of corruption
and lack of enforcement of existing laws.
There is a lot of coercion of vulnerable people
to leave valuable land on which they are
settled and illegal occupation both with and
without the tacit support of the legitimate
authorities. Take the example of a female
household head in Kabul District 17 who says:
We have been living here for 15 years
now...During the last two or three years
the income of people working in the city
has been increasing, therefore the rents
have increased as well. There is no one
to control them, because lots of people
who would have the power to do so are
just taking money and are involved in
corruption...Everyone living here is poor;
they cannot do anything against each
other, except for the powerful people
of course, who can do anything they want
to do, like telling us to go elsewhere or
asking for money so we can stay. I don’t
want to name these powerful people. I
think you yourself know better than us
who they are.
Subsequently, this also creates insecurity of
tenure for those who move in. One male
respondent in the same district explained:
We haven’t got enough money to buy a
private house so we have been renting
this house for two years now, but the
rent keeps rising every month. I live here
with my two brothers and their wives
and children. The original landowners
claim that they have title deeds from
President Rabbani’s time. I doubt that
because as far as I  know this
neighbourhood is part of an unplanned
area. So if you ask me who rules, I tell
you it’s the people with the guns. They
sell them the land but they can also take
it back if they want.
Indeed, there is a close relationship between
land grabbing, power and politics. For
example, the governor of Balkh Province at
the time of the study, who is also an important
commander exercising significant control
over the city of Mazar-i-Sharif, is engaged in
an assiduous process of “buying up” land. As
he seeks to consolidate his political position
distribution of land will undoubtedly help
enhance his power. Minor commanders are
involved in land grabbing as well, often for
immediate gain to compensate for an
increasing loss of influence as a result of the
recent partial appeasement of the country.
Either way, some informants reported that
land taken by commanders was often grabbed
rather than purchased. For example, a 50-
year-old mother living in Kotale Khair Khana
(Kabul District 17) whose son is an officer in
the Afghan army reported: “This is our own
house; we built it last winter [2003—04].
However, we don’t have the title deeds for
the land. It was just distributed by the
government to one of the commanders, who
then gave it to others.”
Ownership is consequently contested, often
violently and sometimes fatally. A male
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 39
Shaping Urban Futures: Challenges to Governing and Managing Afghan Cities
respondent living in a hillside neighbourhood
in Kabul District 16 explained:
This here is government land, but they
are building houses on the top of the
hill, which used to be our rainfed land.
When they had finished building these
houses they were selling them to other
people. Now they are trying to get the
whole area under their control. One day
they came and destroyed the wall of one
of our houses. They wanted to occupy it;
therefore we had to fight them. They
injured one of our relatives but we
persisted, because we want to keep this
land to build a clinic or at least a school.
However the authorities don’t help us,
and the pressure by those who try to
occupy it is increasing day by day.
An older male in Kabul’s destroyed centre in
District 1 warned:
We are having good neighbours around
us; none of them do us any harm. But in
the parallel street, there are some people
who are powerful because they are
involved in selling opium and poppy, so
no one can stop them, not even the
government authorities, because they
Box 3. Insecurity of tenure among the Kuchis of Shadayee Refugee Camp
The Kuchis of Shadayee Refugee Camp are a telling example of how people can become powerless as a
result of struggles between local commanders, provincial authorities and the limited remits of international
agencies. The Kuchis originally came from the Gulran District of Herat Province, about 80km from Herat
City. A nomadic cattle-rearing people, they lost access to their rural livelihoods through drought. They also
lost most of their own animals as well as rural employment opportunities and in 1978 they moved by choice
to Iran. Here the Iranian government confiscated their surviving animals but the men easily found work as
labourers. They were not war refugees and in fact expressed some support for the Taliban. However, they
had to return to Afghanistan at the same time as war-affected returnees and therefore settled in Shadayee
Refugee Camp on the outskirts of Heart District Six, which is located to the far east of the city.
The Kuchis have been there for about three years but the camp is now being closed. While other refugees
have returned to their places of origin, this was not a possibility for this nomadic community, which has
no land or home to which they could return. Testimony to the temporary nature of the camp is the lack
of services. One unemployed male saw it as follows: “The municipality does not do any work in this area;
the centre is so beautiful but they don’t pay attention to District Six where the poor live!”
As representatives of the community, the elders from the shura petitioned the Ministry of Repatriation in
writing and the then Governor of Herat, Ismail Khan, paid for them to travel to Kabul to put their case
before President Karzai. The president allegedly told them they could stay. However, the local commander
in charge of the area, who is said to be linked to Ismail Khan, has refused them permission and has engaged
with them only by force. In addition, the majority of the land has subsequently been given to government
employees and soldiers, as one of the former governor’s projects to reward loyalty and strengthen his
political clout. The Kuchis, however, still believe they are entitled to a proportion of the land but are
neither clear about the size and boundaries nor the legality of the documents they hold in this regard. In
the meantime, as one of the elders explained:
They keep coming. There was a bulldozer destroying the houses around here. We are from Herat.
Those who are from other provinces they can go to their houses but we have nowhere else to go ...
but they say to us “you must go because the land belongs to the commanders.”
To be sure, this is a deprived rather than a destitute community and their insecurity points to vulnerability
rather than absolute poverty. The men work as porters in Herat’s central bazaar and the children attend
the local school. One of the women put their case unequivocally: “We don’t want anything. We can solve
all our problems ourselves. But we have nowhere to go and we want to stay here. This is what we want
from the government: we want to live here.”
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know all of them. They are occupying
other houses and if the owners of these
houses come back and demand that they
leave they will kill them. No one dares
to stand up to them.
A senior UN figure in Mazar concluded that
even when disputes are taken to Kabul for
resolution, the rulings “are not effective
because you cannot get people to agree with
the outcomes” and “with no enforcement it
reverts back to the rule of the strongest.” A
similar relationship between political
competition and power and tenure insecurity
for the most vulnerable urban dwellers is
highlighted in a case study from Herat,
presented in Box 3.
Land grabbing is also prevalent in Kabul. The
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) assists poor
and vulnerable people with land disputes.
Their analysis of recent cases dealt with in
Kabul (Table 4), which they see as
representing only a fraction of land disputes,
is revealing.
Table 4. Current NRC land dispute cases in Kabul49
Type of Cases Proportion of Cases
Cases of land grabbing involving commanders 13%
Cases involving disputes with government officials, people from 16%
political parties or court judges
Cases of “pure” corruption, for example, demand for bribes from 7%
municipal or court officials
Cases involving problems with the municipality, for example, 13%
compensation claims from people being evicted from land allocated
to a road or development project*
“Not sure” category because the client has not come back or 15%
the case is not concluded
Ordinary people with disputes — for example, two people disputing 36%
ownership of the same house or piece of land or family members
quarrelling over inheritance issues
Total 100%
*This is on the low side as some municipality cases will fall into the cases involving government officials or corruption.
As can be seen from the NRC caseload, not
all land disputes are the result of public and
private corruption or political machinations.
A lot of the cases handled arise out of family
and inheritance squabbles or because people
have been away for years on end and others
have occupied their abandoned houses. So
there are running disputes over who has the
right to live in a place or to sell it. As one of
the caseworkers lamented, “It is difficult to
know the right answer in these cases. So it
is chaos out there.”
Housing shortages, high land prices and
escalating rents are putting pressure on
housing at every level. A widow living in the
remnants of a destroyed building in Bagh Ali
Mardan in the centre of Kabul explained:
I was living in Qalai Zaman Khan before
I came here. That was in a rented house
and I was paying 300 Afs [US$6] per
month. Then the rent increased, so I
eventually had to move here with my
49 This table is compiled from information provided verbally by the Norwegian Refugee Council in 2004.
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Box 4. Insecurity of tenure on the part of
vulnerable family members
A widow used to live in Wardak in her husband’s
property but moved to Kabul during the war. Her
husband died and her house in Kabul was destroyed
during the war. Her husband’s brothers took over
the house in Wardak and tried to cement their
ownership of it through arranging the marriage of
one of her daughters to one of their sons. They
also tried to sell her plot in Kabul. The widow’s
case was referred to the Norwegian Refugee
Council, who were able to protect her and her
property...”for the time being at least”.
50 A shura is a consultative forum restricted to the elders of a community. A jirga is a wider decision-making forum at which,
theoretically at least, all adult males can participate. They are said to base their decisions on Islamic law but they are
also heavily influenced by Afghan tribal custom.
51 Foley, C. Land and Property Disputes in Eastern Afghanistan. Kabul: Norwegian Refugee Council. 2004, 4.
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children. This is a private house that
belongs to my neighbour. He is my cousin.
I am not paying him any money for living
here, but now he and his wife want to
rebuild it and have asked me to leave. I
don’t know where to go.
Among high-income groups, an increase in
the number of returnee Afghans who for the
last decade or more have resided in the West,
as well as a large and growing expatriate
community, has put pressure on rents at the
high-income end of the housing market. This
in turn has put pressure on housing costs at
the middle-income level and so on down.
Add to this the massive damage of housing
stock by war and conflict as well as the return
of less well-off refugees and the extent of
IDPs still living in the city, it is not surprising
then that there are tensions within
communities and families over access to or
ownership of land and houses. Hence a
number of land dispute cases involve
squabbles between family members over who
has the right to live in or sell a house or piece
of land. Invariably in such cases it is the more
vulnerable family members who lose out, as
evident from the case in Box 4.
4.1.3 Addressing land management and
security of tenure
Urban land management is seen as critical
because, in addition to issues of urban poverty
and vulnerability, many among the Afghan
elite lost property. High- and middle-income
refugee families returned to find that their
homes had been handed over to others. From
the perspective of urban management it is
seen as a vital component of the overall
urban revitalisation strategy because it is not
possible to set up a proper local revenue
system without some idea of property values
and ownership. Interesting comparisons can
be drawn with the experiences of Kosovo and
Timor-Leste, related in Box 5. Nevertheless,
urban land administration is difficult to
address for two critical reasons. First, land
grabbing and land disputes involve very
powerful and well-defended interests.
Second, the institutional infrastructure for
coordinating land administration and
management and enforcing the decisions of
courts and other dispute resolution
mechanisms is weak. In other words, even
when the courts or public authorities issue
fair decisions, there is no guarantee they can
be enforced because of the lack of a rule of
law, with powerful commanders and other
elites seeing themselves as above the law.
As a result, many land and property
transactions take place without official court
approval, using customary documents or
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms
such as the shura or jirga.50 The shura and
jirga are the “products of Afghanistan’s
patriarchal, tribal society, which lays a strong
emphasis on solving conflicts ‘privately’,
within the family, village or clan.”51 Some
argue that given the current lack of
institutional capacity within the official
system and widespread land grabbing and
corruption, these customary institutions are
Afghans. Afghanistan’s legal system is
based upon principles of Islamic law and
both the courts, on the one hand, and
shura and jirga, on the other, formally
base their decisions on Shari’a law.
Although shuras and jirgas are not
officially recognised within the Afghan
legal system, judges often instruct two
Box 5. Post-conflict land management: lessons from Kosovo and Timor-Leste
Post-conflict administrations in countries like Afghanistan, South Africa, Kosovo and Timor-Leste have had
many urgent land-related challenges to resolve. These have included the establishment or restoration of
legal frameworks, accommodating people dispersed by violence and resolving or pre-empting land disputes.
The latter involves establishing rights, drafting laws and formulating policies and this is only possible in the
context of effective institutions. In Tajikistan, for example, reliance was placed on existing institutions,
while in South Africa and Kosovo entirely new institutional arrangements were put in place to deal with
housing, land and property issues.
In Kosovo the Housing and Property Directorate and Claims Commission (HPD/HPCC) was designed, developed
and implemented with the cooperation of UN-Habitat to assist in the overall regularisation of the residential
property market. The HPD and HPCC have jurisdiction to receive and settle three categories of claims
involving residential property disputes: discriminatory practices of the former regime, informal transaction
on residential property and property loss through usurpation, or illegal occupation, during the period March
1989 to March 1999. Additionally the HPD places vacant or abandoned property under its administration
for the placement of families in humanitarian need of housing, as well as provides a resource to the United
Nations Mission in Kosovo and other institutions in relation to property law in Kosovo.
In Timor-Leste, although new institutions were created to deal with land and property, they did not have
sufficient authority to address housing and property matters and destabilising disputes have persisted. In
August 1999 the people of East Timor voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia in a referendum
supervised by the UN. Chaos and the displacement of a vast number of people followed the vote and the
violent and destructive withdrawal of Indonesia in December 1999 included the killing of many East Timorese,
the burning and destruction of countless properties and the loss of public and private land administration
documents and records. The need to deal with uncertainties around land rights was identified by the Timor
Leste Joint Assessment Mission as one of the most immediate and urgent reconstruction priorities. Uncertainty
about land ownership and the lack of a working land registry represented a real obstacle and a Land and
Property Unit (LPU) was established, alongside the drafting of a land, housing and property policy.
A particular challenge facing the LPU was the large-scale invasion of abandoned houses and buildings and
an application and allocation procedure was developed. Mr Scott Leckie of the Centre on Housing Rights
and Evictions stated that “few issues confronting the people of East Timor are more pervasive and potentially
contentious than those relating to the successful resolution of land disputes and relevant verification of
ownership and tenure claims.” Nevertheless, resolving such claims has proved to be a real challenge for
the Transitional Administration and the current political leadership. Reflecting the urgency, when the
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste gained full independence on 20 May 2002 it was swift to pass new land
laws that same year. However, although UN-Habitat assisted the Constituent Assembly with advice on land
and property clauses for the formulation of a post-independence constitution, the final version contains
only the following singularly unhelpful reference to land and property: “The property, use and useful tenure
of land shall be defined by law.” Ultimately progress has been frustrated by the lack of political will, so
that uncertainty over land rights has become pervasive and debilitating for citizens, government and
development organisations alike and a serious threat to ensuring a stable foundation for future development.
Sources: duPleiss, J. “Land Plays a Key Role in Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” and Meeuwissen, J. “Land Management
in a Post-Conflict Society: The Timor-Leste Story.” Habitat Debate. December 2003; 9-10.
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potentially useful mechanisms for settling
land disputes:
At their best, they are the closest thing
to democratic institutions in the country
today. They can reach decisions much
faster than the official courts, are
virtually cost-free, are less susceptible
to bribery and are accessible to illiterate
52 Ibid. This indeed resonates in the practices of the Special Property Disputes Resolution Court as described above.
parties to a dispute to first try resolving
his or her differences through this
mechanism.52
In terms of how they can assist with security
of tenure, customary institutions do not
always work easily with the concept of
individual property rights and require careful
intervention. This may serve to protect
vulnerable urban dwellers in the short term
at least. However, the shura and jirga are
problematic arenas of decision-making not
least because participation is restricted to
men (and mainly the elders) and tend to
serve ethnic majorities in their communal
interest, often to the detriment of other
ethnicities — in particular with respect to
Kuchis. Furthermore, their deliberations
rarely operate in favour of women and there
is little to suggest that they are less open to
manipulation or corruption than other
institutional forms. Nevertheless, as long as
there is such widespread distrust of the courts
among ordinary Afghans and as long as
government officials and the police are
virtually absent from the everyday lives of
average residents or worse, are part of the
problem rather than the solution, the informal
mechanisms towards resolving land disputes
provided by the shura and jirga remain
important, including in urban areas.
USAID together with Deloitte and Touche are
undertaking a vast formal land titling exercise
in Kabul. This is an important initiative.
However, development projects, land disputes
and the growth of informal settlements are
continuing apace. With this in mind a good
example is being set by the World Bank’s
Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project (KURP),
which is including land management alongside
the upgrading process. While the documents
issued do not constitute legal title to the
land according to Afghan law, they afford
some security of tenure. It is intended that
there can be harmonisation of land records
and titles in the longer term, which is not an
exaggerated expectation given the dynamics
governing such processes in the recent past.
Something that needs to be monitored over
the course of KURP and other similar projects
is whether the upgrading process itself might
lead to further tenure insecurity as improved
services potentially give rise to increased
rents.
Furthermore, putting in place a coherent
land management system is complicated by
the fact that different government
departments adopt different approaches to
the issue. Taking Kabul by way of example,
the municipality has sold off land at knock
down prices to municipal and ministerial
staff. The current mayor has a rather sceptical
attitude towards private sector development
in terms of land, which, in the context of
both regional history and local customs, he
sees as a resource and a source of power for
local government. He aims to accumulate
and develop as much municipal land as
possible, sell it off and buy and develop
further land, in the interests of swelling the
municipal coffers. A similar strategy is being
pursued in Herat City, where the mayor
reported land purchase and property
development — for example banqueting halls
and hotels — as a key strategy for achieving
local financial autonomy and sustainability.
Not only might this strategy prove more
difficult in Kabul but also the municipality is
operating with a model that contrasts with
that of the MUDH, which is very private sector
oriented in relation to land and property
development. Not only does the ministry aim
to support large private sector developments
in partnership with international consulting
companies, but many of the staff in the
ministry themselves are involved in private
construction and property development
companies.
Addressing the issues of land management
and tenure security can be assisted by drawing
on the experience in these matters of donors
currently working in Afghanistan. In addition
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to USAID support for a large scale formal land
titling programme, the World Bank has taken
a lead in incorporating informal tenure
security exercises within an area-based
development strategy. UN-Habitat has a long
track record in undertaking community-led
informal land titling, within an incremental
process of formalising informal land
administration arrangements. This would be
feasible in Afghanistan in coordination with
NGOs working in urban communities and
involving the Loya Jirga and shuras in a
process led by the MUDH.
4.2 Extending and sustaining
urban services
The urban services challenge involves
addressing both the maintenance backlog in
already serviced areas as well as extending
services to more recently occupied and
informal areas. Critical to encouraging the
participation of urban residents in urban
services provision, whether through
involvement in delivery or maintenance or
payment of user charges, is a level of security
in urban living. Fundamental here is security
of tenure because insecurity induces
reluctance on the part of urban residents to
invest physical and emotional energy or
resources of any kind into an area of which
they may not remain a part. Where security
of tenure exists, this research demonstrated
that many Afghans have learned to cope with
financial insecurity and prioritise investments
that have a sustainable impact on their living
conditions. For example, reviewing a range
of activities at the project level, it is clear
that some communities prioritise initiatives
with long-term effects (such as fixing the
sewerage and water supply) over projects
that aim to improve individual incomes, for
example through cash-for-work schemes.
Infrastructure improvements that focus on
repairs, road maintenance or temporary
shelter, for example, and also provide
employment and skills development obviously
meet the preferences of residents with
greater and lesser financial and tenure
security.
4.2.1 Water supply and sanitation
In addition to the issue of access and
entitlement to land, extending urban services
involves recognising the prevalence of large
informal settlements and engaging with them.
Putting pressure on residents by threatening
to remove existing houses is not only
politically unviable, but constitutes a step
in the wrong direction in terms of realistic
urban management given that informal
settlements house well over half of all urban
residents. However, people construct informal
settlements in areas where it is not always
easy to extend infrastructure and services,
which has to be undertaken in the context
of prudent urban management and anticipated
issues of environmental sustainability. For
example, in Kabul the water supply is limited
and a falling water table is in evidence. This
is also of concern given plans for a satellite
city for 200,000 inhabitants to the north of
the capital, a project pushed by a major
bilateral donor. One key informant heavily
criticised the project, calling it an unviable
pursuit and a “real estate deal” involving
influential Afghan investors who were buying
cheap land in the designated area with the
aim of bailing out later on. The informant
also claimed that the cost per family would
be ten times the average cost of usual housing
schemes.
Efforts by UN-Habitat to introduce eco toilets,
in the form of twin tank latrines, constitute
a low tech and prudent response to issues of
sustainability. However, they require both
education and commitment on the part of
community members and are difficult to
sustain without ongoing support.53 Community
education projects on basic hygiene have
53 As these toilets involve separating wet from dry night soil they are easier for men to use than women and more likely to
succeed among adults than children.
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also been launched, e.g. run by the NGO
Action Contre la Faim in Kabul and Mazar,
and seek to create an understanding of the
need to maintain minimum distances between
latrines and wells. Even in Herat, arguably
the best serviced large city in Afghanistan,
some residents continue living in dire hygienic
conditions. Says a mother of seven in Herat
District 9:
... there is also no proper sanitation
facility — the children go to the desert;
the older people have to go in the yard
of the house and then cover it up.
4.2.2 Solid waste management
While secondary waste collection54 is well
managed in Herat, this is not the case
everywhere else. For example, in Kabul,
collection from transit points is not always
timely. Moreover, after the resistance of
nearby village residents, the initial site for
the largest waste facility in the Kabul area
had to be relocated. Rubbish is currently
being dumped eastwards of the city, but due
to an inefficient collection system and
capacity shortages, about half of the daily
amount of litter remains in the city. There
are some positive signs that primary
collection55 of solid waste has been well
developed in some of the low-income areas
of Kabul through community mobilisation and
management.
Problems of solid waste management in
Afghan cities were found to be similar to
those found elsewhere. As a woman in Herat
District 9 put it: “We really have a problem
with litter here in our street. We just put it
anywhere we want.” However, there were
also some areas of success in this arena.  A
lorry driver in Kabul District 16 pointed out
that there was occasional collaboration among
residents and that they were using their own
resources in the process:
Sometimes we do get together and do
some work in our streets. For example,
when the municipality had not come here
for a long time and the waste was piling
up, we collected everything and I used
my own truck to transport the waste to
that place near the main road where the
municipality could see it.
UN-Habitat introduced a system of primary
waste collection known locally as the “Karachi
system” into a number of cities. It appears
to work best when it does not rely on the
community itself but rather when the
community contracts with a micro-
entrepreneur. A mother of five in Herat
District 6 explained their situation:
Waste is not collected here by the
municipality, but by people with
wheelbarrows. Every family has to pay
ten Afghanis [US$0.20] per week for this
service. Sanitation facilities are
insufficient; the waste is taken away by
the farmers who use them for agriculture,
but we have to pay for this removal as
well. There is also no electricity. During
the winter we buy wood for heating; this
is really expensive — every four kilos
costs us 20 Afs [US$0.40].
Community mobilisation can be difficult to
organise and sustain in contexts of
vulnerability, insecurity and low levels of
trust. The issue of affordability is equally
important, as explained by a Mazar housewife
from District 10:
Waste is really a problem here. There
was the Karachi system but it finished
and the municipality did not step in to
collect the waste, even though this would
have to be done every ten days...
Fortunately we can afford electricity and
water because of my husband’s income
54 Secondary collection is from a transit point or transfer station within a city to a final dumping site outside it.
55 Primary collection refers to the removal of garbage from the neighbourhood. This can either be through a door-to-door
collection service, most common in better off areas or through street level collection, for example from bins or a designated
plot where waste is dumped.
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Box 6. Connecting the “urban village”: Chahar Asyab and Shewaki in Kabul’s District 7
Chahar Asyab and Shewaki are neighbourhoods located in the outskirts of Kabul District 7. Residents are
predominantly Pashtun; mujaheddin leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had one of his strongholds in this area
when the battle for the capital became increasingly intense during the early 1990s. Due to security concerns
the principal researchers were unable to conduct interviews in these areas; the team of three interviewers
therefore consisted of one Afghan senior researcher and two Afghan assistants.
One of them described their initial impression when they arrived in the area:
We went to Elyas Khail, which is a rural settlement in the Chahar Asyab District, almost like a village.
It was far away from the main road and included 600 households. After talking to various people on
the street our impression was that it was not possible to do interviews in respondents’ homes. They
preferred us to sit down and talk with the authorised people, such as the representative of the village.
They were very doubtful of us.
The elders subsequently stated that they were unaware of the legal status of the land they settled on but
insisted that all houses were “private”. They pointed out that they did not receive any municipal services
but were in contact with the district representative. However, they claimed not to have received much
assistance so far. “We went to the district representatives to get connected to the public transportation
system, but they did not accept our request, even when we told them that we would be willing to pay five
Afs per person [the usual fare is 2—3 Afs per person], they did not accept that” says one respondent. Another
man stressed the absence of potable water, saying: “We don’t even have drinking water, and we are carrying
water with our donkeys and cars to the village from wherever water can be found. No one has asked us
about our problems so far or has come to help us.”
The team then moved on to Shewaki, which according to the researchers appeared slightly more “urban”
due to a higher density of buildings and a somewhat more structured outline of roads and settlements.
Three in-depth interviews were conducted, one of them with the wakil of a neighbourhood. He said:
The land here belongs to two men. Most of the people have their own houses and have built them
without assistance from organisations or the government. But for those who are renting expenses have
risen steadily. Two years ago the monthly rent for a shop was 400—500 Afs [US$8—10] but right now
it is around 1,200—1,500 Afs [US$24—30]. On top of this shop owners have to pay taxes. Some of the
people had to move away because of the high rents. I have nothing to do these days. I was relying on
the income of my land, but right now I am jobless because of the recent drought.
As in other districts visited, basic collective action worked particularly well in the context of waste collection.
More surprisingly however, the access to and use of water, a potentially more controversial pool resource
than maintaining a clean environment, has not caused any significant conflicts so far despite its scarcity.
Says the wakil, “the water system is terrible here, because in this whole area there are just three hand
pumps and one well. One hand pump was built by an international agency some years ago, so all of the
people were going and getting water from here. Still, so far there has not been any major dispute about
water. People manage to get along.” In general, disputes among the residents were clearly regarded to be
less pressing an issue than the need to connect the neighbourhood to basic urban services despite its remote
location and to provide both political stability and security of housing.
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as a traffic policeman. He earns 3,500
Afghanis [US$70] a month, which is
enough to pay for these services. Our
two daughters go to school and our son
goes to the kindergarten. We also have
a good doctor who is our neighbour, so
we can easily see him and he treats
us well.
Some large neighbourhoods are not serviced
at all and when residents are poor or insecure
they are either unable or unwilling to invest
in their immediate environment. One example
encountered in Mazar-i-Sharif was half of an
entire district being without services. It is
perhaps not coincidental that the unserviced
section was home to another excluded
56 See, for example, Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC). Take the Guns Away. Kabul: HRRAC. September
2004.
Our children go to school, but we don’t
feel secure here because recently some
children got kidnapped. Residents of this
area managed to arrest the three
kidnappers and informed the security
people, but after a couple of days the
men were released. They probably bribed
the security personnel. The residents
eventually decided to capture them again
and killed them.
While it is difficult to validate these claims,
kidnapping is a source of wide anxiety that
has been reported in other studies as well.56
Moreover, it was a concern for respondents
in all three cities studied. Those who raised
this issue emphasised that short distances to
schools were important to decrease the risk.
In addition, long distances travelled by
children mean they have to cross main roads,
exacerbating not only their vulnerability to
drive-by abductions but also physical danger
from traffic accidents.
Indeed, another crucial urban management
issue is the increasing density of traffic,
particularly in Kabul. In a recent study on
youth vulnerability, children mentioned that
their greatest fear was to be run over by a
car. Pollution (mainly from car and truck
emissions) is an additional health risk factor
that has to be countered by developing and
implementing effective regulative frameworks
and standards. This will require coordination
with the Ministry of Public Works and ideally,
given the problem of unemployment in the
city, should be pursued in the context of
labour intensive strategies. However, public
transportation in Kabul and Herat (to a lesser
extent also in Mazar) received a positive
response from residents in terms of reliability
and affordability. This included provision
both through public transportation systems
and informal private transport networks.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)48
Issues Paper Series
minority in the city, the large Hazara
community. Here, people lived in relative
isolation and without electricity, waste
collection, regular transportation or
protection by the local police.
4.2.3 The wider urban environment
An important aspect of the urban environment
is public safety. Despite anecdotal evidence
that the level of crime was increasing in
Kabul, very few respondents in the
neighbourhoods studied actually mentioned
feelings of insecurity. Some pointed to
occasional robberies in the street, although
these seldom lead to casualties or resulted
in injuries. While people saw crime as less
significant among their myriad problems,
insecurity was nonetheless a problem,
especially in the case of groups that were
vulnerable as a whole. For instance, in the
Hazara community of Mazar, the young men
had formed themselves into a local militia
and were patrolling the area because incidents
against residents were reported regularly.
Local policing is poorly provided at the
neighbourhood level. When arrests are made
the system of law and order fails to prosecute
or impose sanctions. For example, three
respondents complained that those arrested
by the police had been freed after paying a
bribe. It is unclear whether these accounts
reflected a general dissatisfaction with
institutions of public security, or whether
they were confined to specific incidents.
However, a number of respondents expressed
fear of their children being abducted, whether
for ransom, child labour, prostitution or organ
transplantation. Two of those interviewed
claimed that they personally knew of cases
where children had disappeared and later
been found mutilated. A woman telling her
story in a community centre in Kabul’s east
district said:
Working towards sustain-
ability also requires taking
limited energy resources
into account, a significant
challenge in Afghan cities
that cannot be avoided.
Poor electricity means
those who can afford it
use their own generators.
Not  on ly  are  fue l
resources for generators
limited but the practice
leads to a dependency on
global markets. In the
case of low-income
h o u s e h o l d s  w h e r e
generators are not an option, winter
vulnerability to the cold stands to remove
sources of wood and other local options for
fuel for heating.57  These issues are important
in illustrating that the dangers inherent in
the urban environment in Afghanistan relate
not only to the legacy of war but the hazards
of reconstruction.
4.3  Planning and managing
Afghanistan’s urban future
The most critical challenge facing the urban
sector in Afghanistan is to update current
approaches to urban planning and
management. In effect this means giving up
the commonly held commitment both to
existing master plans and the professional
practice of master planning. There is a widely
held view among urban professionals in
Afghanistan of planning as design. There is
a need to extend the imagination of planners
towards thinking about strategic urban
development, as well as responsive
management that can engage with changes
at the city level. This in turn entails a more
collaborative and communicative approach
to planning and management, both at the
city and sub-city levels.
Clearly this constitutes a challenge, as many
current urban planners are wedded to existing
and familiar approaches and practices.
Further, there are few young professionals
coming into the system who have capacity
in new methodologies, systems and
equipment. Yet Afghanistan is blessed with
a wealth of well-trained Afghan returnees
who represent an opportunity for the
modernisat ion of  urban planning,
management and practice. As one advisor
put it:
We should hire more exile Afghans with
20 years of international experience in
Germany, Pakistan or France and pay for
English interpreters if necessary, rather
than have more international staff who
do not necessarily understand our culture
and who don’t speak our languages.
The impatience with central and master
planning preferences on the part of some
expatriate donors and advisors has not been
helpful, as changes take time and effort and
occur only once new ways of doing things are
internalised and owned.
A public sector reform process has begun
through the creation of an Independent
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57 See Grace, J. 100 Households in Kabul: A Study of Winter Vulnerability. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.
August 2003.
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Administrative Reform and Civil Service
Commission funded by the Open Society
Institute. At present it is at the stage of
conducting research, with research units in
Kabul and the field areas (which include the
provinces Herat, Balkh and Nangarhar) and
is targeted at provincial governments.
Ultimately the process
will be extended to
o t h e r  l e v e l s  o f
government. As one of
t h e  r e s e a r c h e r s
explained, capacity
building is the main goal but if this is not
successful then at least organisational change
will ensue, despite the fact that it will be a
challenge:
If you cut an old person he will not agree.
If you say you are not capable and do not
have skills he will be angry. If you cut
someone and say we do not want this
function they will also complain and stand
against us. In the restructuring if you
have one person selected the chief will
stand against us because we chose in the
open system. It will take a very long time
— up to ten or fifteen years. It is not a
short-term programme.
Both Afghan and international staff involved
in urban policymaking and planning have
lamented the fact that the call for capacity
building has so far not been met in practice.
There is a prevailing and unsustainable
reliance on non-Afghan expertise. While this
was an appropriate response to immediate
post-war reconstruction, the shift from
emergency conditions to development now
needs to be made, in the recognition that
conflict (if not war) is and will remain a part
of Afghan life for the foreseeable future.
Hence, expatriates need to be replaced or
redeployed over time through a process of
hiring a higher percentage of returning
refugees with the necessary qualifications,
supporting at the same time their immersion
into the challenges of contemporary urban
Afghanistan, as well as enhancing the capacity
of educated Afghans.
In this context, the tendency to rely on short-
term training fixes has to give way to a
sequenced and more strategic approach to
capacity building, which will have to be
planned, budgeted for
and implemented in the
short, medium and
longer term. The
foundations for this
approach exist in the
NUP and it is important that the goals and
action defined therein are implemented, for
example: seminar- and workshop-based
capacity building in the short term, a clear
commitment to on-the-job training in the
context of ongoing programmes and projects
in the medium term, and in the longer term,
skills development and education through
curricula development and support to
universities and technical colleges.
Capacity building is ultimately about creating
understanding and commitment by gradually
devolving responsibility within clearly defined
and realisable frameworks. The NUP is an
important starting point for the creation of
better functioning cities in Afghanistan, but
its lack of concreteness and its unclear
financial viability leave room for question.
There are also institutional issues at stake.
Rejuvenation of urban planning and
management promises to be difficult because
remuneration and working conditions in the
public sector are not optimal. While Afghans
who remained see government jobs as the
employment option of choice, not least
because they have found ways of
supplementing their income with private
development activities in the sector,
returnees or younger professionals of calibre
are unlikely to be attracted to low paid
positions in a fairly moribund public sector.
Hence capacity building and institutional
restructuring in the urban context is critically
linked to strategies towards public sector
reform.
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The shift from emergency conditions to development
now needs to be made, in the recognition that
conflict (if not war) is and will remain a part of
Afghan life for the foreseeable future.
5.1  Creating links between state
and society
Achieving effective urban management in
Afghanistan means balancing and prioritising
limited resources against overwhelming needs.
This is above all a political process and one
that requires attention to urban governance
in a context where expectations of and trust
in government is at low ebb. Under such
circumstances an urgent task is to improve
channels of communication between
government agencies and agents and
organisations of civil society. Traversing
various levels of authority are traditional
systems of accountability and justice. These
also need to be taken into account.
Community organisers interviewed for this
study repeatedly underscored the importance
of moving from local-level conflict to local-
level cooperation. In practice, reported
experiences were mixed. Three key challenges
were identified:
• First and foremost, beneficiary
identification and coordination with
municipal employees were frequently
held up or completely stymied by local-
level corruption.
• Second, reliance on community mobilis-
ation to supplement or substitute for poor
municipal or other government services
requires trust among neighbours and long-
term commitment to living in an area.
Both are in short supply in mobile and
insecure post-war urban environments.
• Third, community development in cities
needs to be harnessed and coordinated
with a diverse landscape of public and
private players at multiple levels:
min i s ter ia l ,  c i ty ,  d i s t r ict  and
5. Moving Forward: Addressing the Challenges to
Urban Governance
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neighbourhood. However, existing
mechanisms of interaction lack legitimacy
and inclusiveness of all citizens. As such,
they are not likely to render desirable
results in terms of reducing vulnerability.
Turning things around will involve a gradual
process but persistence may well be
rewarded. A number of urban residents
interviewed for this study expressed
understanding over the backlog in service
delivery and slow responsiveness to their
needs. In fact, only a few shared the opinion
offered by a 35-year-old woman in Kabul
District 16: “We want the government to help
us in every aspect of our life.” Most
respondents were realistic if pessimistic about
the situation in which they found themselves.
Said a male respondent in Kabul District 17:
I can understand that the government
doesn’t come here. The government
doesn’t have time to think about this
area, because they have to deal with so
many things. They need more time. Maybe
in the future they will help us, but for
now there is peace at least. We have to
help ourselves.
Citizens were also aware of problems at
higher levels of governance. For example, a
journalism student in Mazar District 7 shared
his views about the lack of local-central
accountability when he said:
Our kalantar spoke with the mayor about
our problems regarding waste collection,
sanitation and hygiene, but the
municipality hasn’t done anything for
this district so far. The central
government should replace the mayor,
but they cannot do it because there is
no central government!
Nevertheless, the fact that the government
is somehow absent in people’s lives is
something that needs addressing. Indeed this
was one of the main themes that emerged
from the household-level interviews and many
respondents reiterated the need to develop
alternative routes for decision making and
mechanisms for implementation. A crucial
issue for government, donors and NGOs is
how relations between government and the
people and among residents themselves can
be strengthened.
Not only is there awareness among everyday
people about the strengths and weaknesses
of government but also a willingness to be
engaged in a process of reconstruction that
holds some advantage. Building on shared
experience and understanding of the
constraints of a post-war environment there
was evidence of the (re)emergence of a
shared identity. Said one Mazar respondent:
We are all Afghan brothers, so we have
to help each other. Here in this
neighbourhood we meet regularly in the
mosque to solve the problems of the
community, and it doesn’t matter to
which tribe you belong.
Even though such sentiments might still be
rare and often contradicted by ethnic and
tribal contestation, they do indicate the
potential for the reconciliation necessary to
build social cohesion and trust in urban areas.
This may be possible particularly in districts
with high percentages of newly arrived IDPs,
whether permanent rural in-migrants or labour
migrants who “commute” between their
village and the city.
Similarly, residents were often found to have
shared interests but lacked the basic
motivation or incentives for collective and
reciprocal action. Where this is evident is in
areas such waste collection, local
infrastructure improvement, maintaining
security and low-cost examples of neighbour-
hood assistance. There is a tendency for
urban policy to rely or build on such examples
of reciprocity and self-help. This can erode
the scant resources of the poor and it is
important that urban policy and planning
takes this into account and that in their
interventions donors consider ways of
encouraging and embellishing the efforts of
vulnerable urban dwellers. On the part of
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government agencies and particularly
municipalities, it is important that processes
and mechanisms are established through
which citizens are given the opportunity to
express their concerns, learn through
experience and where the municipality can
demonstrate it has taken their priorities
seriously. Incentives need to be put in place
that encourage both community-level and
municipal entities to cooperate, for example
through processes of “co-production”58 in
the context of targeted or area-based local
development and through means that reduce
the potential for political interference.59
Micro-level mobilisation and collective action
were the main goals of the UN-Habitat-funded
community development councils (CDCs).
These were first established in Mazar-i-Sharif
in 1995. UN-Habitat subsequently withdrew
from their management, which now falls
under the National Solidarity Programme
(NSP) coordinated by the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development. Different
organisations are responsible for the oversight
of different regions and Afghan-led community
fora (CF) maintain the local and micro-level
structures. The extension of the CDC model
to rural areas has left experience in the cities
somewhat patchy. For example, CDCs are
still quite strong in Mazar-i-Sharif where they
originated but are less robust in Herat. Local
community centres still function in accordance
with basic democratic principles, including
gender equality, elections and fair
representation. As such, they offer an
alternative vehicle for those such as women
and youth who are less able to work through
the shuras. However, tight resources and
unskilled or inexperienced management have
meant that these councils are less involved
in community mobilisation and advocacy and
more focused on practical activities.
Depending on the area these might include
sewing circles or educational activities such
as English lessons or computer classes.
The fora enjoy widespread acceptance within
many neighbourhoods, despite occasional
attempts by local leaders to discredit them
through allegations as to their prudence or
honesty or through clandestine interventions
with local authorities. One CF worker in Mazar
explained:
We have a big problem with the local
government. Commanders and gunmen
do not like us. The governor is also not
supportive of our communities because
he thinks we take power from him, and
the commanders interfere with the CFs
through the mullahs, who say people in
the CFs are Christians. This is ridiculous,
because we are all Muslims! Fortunately
the central government is supportive of
us, and we work with the Ministries of
Women, Labour and Social Affairs, and
Education. We are important to them
because more than 3,000 students study
in CFs in Mazar. Once the local education
department wanted to close down all the
CFs, so we had to get a letter from the
ministry in Kabul to stop them.
For the CDC model to grow and evolve it
clearly needs sound management and
sustained funding that includes organisational
and operational costs. This in turn is
contingent to a degree upon the local political
environment in which CDCs are immersed.
As illustrated by the statement above, urban—
national links can help ease the pressure
under which local civil society organisations
are operating. The CDC model is by no means
the only one. NGOs are working with
communities and community organisations
in a variety of ways. However, similar
problems to those reported in relation to CFs
were found across a number of other NGO
58 Ostrom (1996) describes co-production as a system in which state and society members cooperate around a task or project,
according to what they can offer and what each does best.
59 A bilateral donor is currently involved in building capacity for elected representatives that link up with the shuras. However,
kalantars and wakils are still the major communication point for municipal employees, and processes of prioritisation and
allocation remain vulnerable to manipulation.
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initiatives. In Kabul, for example,
implementing agencies reported problems
with sustainability and scaling up due to high
staff turnover. Organisation-wide capacity
building and training at all levels of urban
governance thus becomes crucial.
Developing engaged urban citizenship in
Afghanistan is not merely a theoretical
aspiration but an urgent task. Achieving it
depends on strengthening the visibility of the
view from below in terms of informing
government and fostering grassroots level
mobilisation and understanding of the
strategic imperatives of urban development,
not only in individual neighbourhoods but at
a citywide level as well. As evidenced by the
interviews, urban residents in Afghanistan
would warmly welcome efforts in this
direction and demonstrate encouraging scope
for institutionalising local-level cooperation.
5.2 Creating links between actors
involved in urban management
and governance
The future of Afghanistan’s cities does not
lie with urban citizens and municipalities
alone. Inter-governmental relations are
equally important. In an international context
where the trend is towards promoting greater
decentralisation, the thrust in Afghanistan is
towards centralisation. This is part and parcel
of the nation-building project and efforts to
strengthen the authority and reach of
government in Kabul. A tug in the opposite
direction, what above has been called de
facto decentralisation, comes from local
power brokers, commanders and forces
seeking to maintain or extend regional power
and resources. Among urban citizens there
was considerable sympathy for a strong
Afghanistan but a pragmatic acceptance that
their own fates were often sealed at provincial
or municipal level rather than by decisions
made in the capital.
Among officials and bureaucrats there was a
strong understanding of de jure workings
between central, provincial and local
government departments as well as some of
the confusions and overlaps leading to
inefficiencies in inter-governmental relations.
An important forward trajectory in order to
reduce these, as well as to strengthen the
coordinating role of the centre, must involve
increasing municipal and ministerial capacity
at sub-national levels, in terms of both
resources and skills. This is necessary if the
views, insights and demands of citizens are
ever to be taken seriously at different levels
of government and for citizens to become
appreciated and cooperative partners in urban
development.
Improved communication and coordination
need also to include actors in international
organisations, whether donor agencies or
NGOs. Comparative perspectives and
experiences from other international contexts
are absolutely critical in helping Afghans
decide on processes and priorities for
themselves. However, how they are used and
shared is equally important. To date,
structures and mechanisms for linking the
wealth of locally generated knowledge,
information and experience with knowledge
at the policymaking level are underdeveloped.
Immediate efforts are needed towards greater
communication and cooperation between
different government agencies, different
tiers of government, between the centre and
the regions, and between Afghan and
international actors and organisations involved
in urban development. This must be seen as
a prerequisite for increasing the leverage of
limited funds. Actionable recommendations
for improvement in this key area of urban
governance are provided in the next section.
While these are worthy goals that require
relentless pursuit, it is also important to
recognise the immediate reality of urban
governance in Afghanistan and to work with
it creatively, identifying the room for
manoeuvre within it to address issues of
urban vulnerability. There is a blindingly
obvious need for urban development deriving
from urbanisation and the legacy of war.
However, it is also the case that the current
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political context demands immediate and
visible development projects. Both the
government in Kabul and international donors
need to demonstrate with some urgency
investment on the ground.  Both the peace
and the nation-building project depends on
the effective roll out of the National Priority
Programmes.
There is a huge temptation under such
circumstances to skip the early stages of
programme management in order to see fast
results, to implement from above without
attention to what is going on below, or even
to the side. In Afghanistan this may well be
reinforced by the involvement of planners in
military structures in the urban sector. Well
meaning though they might be, their approach
is one that is concerned with ends rather
than means. This could have long-term
implications for urban governance and the
sustainability of the urban development, as
well as on approaches to urban management
and governance that become entrenched. It
is important that the rigidity of master
planning is not simply replaced with other
kinds of rigidity in cities that are in a state
of social, economic and institutional flux and
where iterative approaches are most
appropriate. As one urban professional put
it: “There is no end state in the urban sector,
it is all process and the end state constantly
changes.”
5.3  Recommendations
Some recommendations apply across the
board while other strategies are particularly
urgent in respect to each of the three cities
studied. This section begins, therefore, by
identifying challenges and possible responses
that are especially urgent for each of the
study cities, before providing an overview of
immediate measures, intermediate
approaches and forward-looking strategies
for the urban sector as a whole.
5.3.1 City-specific priorities
In Kabul, a first priority is security of tenure.
While the issues discussed here hold for the
other cities as well, the situation is
particularly urgent in the capital. The issue
of sequencing activities is important here. It
is not necessary or even possible to hold off
on engaging with informal land markets and
systems of land titling until a formal titling
process has taken place. If efforts are
underway or can be started in the meantime,
a process of ex post facto harmonisation can
take place. A second priority for Kabul is to
clarify the relationship between Kabul
Municipality and the MUDH and to enhance
communication and coordination between
them.
In Mazar large sections of the city are not
connected to water and sewerage systems
and rely on private generators. In addition,
employment generation is critical in a context
where a vast number of citizens are
unemployed and where the city is a potential
source of alternative jobs than those to be
found working with or cultivating opium
poppies. Again, the imperative of local
economic development and employment
creation is not confined to Mazar but was
particularly evident in that small city where
alternative livelihoods were either scarce or
difficult. Institutional and budgetary
relationships between provincial and central
government and between the province and
the municipality merit particular scrutiny in
Mazar, where residents are being penalised
by poor performance in relation to the city.
This is both on the part of the central
government that has been unable to
coordinate or control the activities of factional
leaders acting in and on the city and on the
part of provincial and municipal government
themselves. Incentives for improved urban
management and governance could be
created in provincial cities in particular,
through an “urbanisation” of the NSP.60 It
60 The NSP’s main goal is to circumvent rural strongmen and to link local communities with the central government so that
policy leverage is increased while simultaneously supporting local development; see, for example, Boesen, op cit.
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may be worth considering this further in
relation to expanding the breadth of concern
in the MUDH.
The situation in Herat warrants a critical
look at the dominance of privatised
(re)construction and the liberal ideology
guiding the development process. Cushioning
these practices with programs facilitating
social inclusion appears expedient, in
conjunction with affordable housing initiatives
that ensure that less affluent and connected
residents can still live and work in the city
centre. However, the single most important
measure in Herat is undoubtedly the creation
of a local civil society that provides a forum
for voicing dissent and that includes social,
political and ethnic diversity.
5.3.2 Immediate measures, intermediate
approaches and forward-looking
strategies
Certain common themes evolved across or
relevant to all three cities that are best dealt
with by coordinated, complementary action.
The following lays out some key parameters
for programming and implementation.
Immediate Measures
• Work with and build on existing master
planning skills (but not the master plan),
for example, knowledge of regulations,
roles and responsibilities, while at the
same time encouraging risk-taking
behaviour. For example, this could involve
working to service and secure unplanned
areas.
• Work towards updating practice and
creating experience through existing area-
based development programmes such as
the Kabul Urban Reconstruction
Programme (KURP).
• Promote educational visits to other
countries and demonstration projects,
particularly in the region.
• Work towards immediate security of
tenure for vulnerable urban dwellers at
the micro-level and in the context of
projects, alongside larger land titling
exercises.
• Conduct issue-based workshops bringing
together government employees (both
municipalities and ministries), private
sector, NGOs and CSOs with a view of
identifying the contribution of different
actors to urban partnerships.
• Conduct capacity-building workshops on
citywide imperat ives  in  urban
development and management for actors
less experienced in the urban sector.
• Create commitment to the NUP among
all urban sector actors through facilitated
discussion, workshops and application to
real-life problems in Afghanistan so that
ownership,  communicat ion and
coordination are promoted.
• Set in place organisational mechanisms
for involving local representatives
alongside government officials in decision-
making processes that involve them. This
should ideally involve intermediary
organisations with access and reach and
be backed with resources and concrete
activities.
• Ensure staff within the MUDH and
municipalities are aware of the work of
the Independent Administrative Reform
and Civil Service Commission and its
implications so that there are
opportunities to respond.
• Build on public awareness of corruption
as an important cause of inefficiency and
poor delivery by setting up an urban
monitoring group that can help tackle
the issues through exposure (e.g. media
expertise), community-level tracking (e.g.
a report card system) and enforcement.
• Work to avoid the worst excesses of
politicised funding of infrastructure and
services in the urban sector by continuing
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to prioritise proper consultation and
coordination through a strengthened urban
coordination group.
• Extend the work being done on revenue
generation and collection through the
MoF to include the commissioning of a
study on municipal finances.
Intermediate Approaches
• Introduce participatory and collaborative
planning as well as more strategic planning
approaches through a “learning-by-doing”
approach in the context of new project
development and implementation, linked
to an operationalised NUP.
• Develop skills in working with informality
in housing, infrastructure and service
provision in the context of integrated
area-based development projects such
as KURP.
• Begin to harmonise informal security of
tenure measures undertaken at the
neighbourhood level or in the context of
projects with formal land titling exercises.
• Develop integrated area-based projects
involving multi-sector partners and with
tangible skills development and capability
building dimensions.
• Create organisational structures for
regular consultation and communication
with urban dwellers about local priorities
and budgets.
• Strengthen the position of the MUDH so
that it can take on a stronger strategic
planning and coordinating role. This will
require investment in skilled staff,
equipment and advisors of an order
enjoyed, for example, by the Ministry of
Rural Rehabilitation and Development.
• Clarify the role of the MUDH vis-à-vis
municipalities, especially in Kabul.
• Assess the growth and effectiveness of
the urban monitoring group on corruption
via appraisals and consultation with
relevant agencies.
• Implement the NUP through government
departments and donor coordination, with
clear milestones and performance
benchmarks.
• Ensure the implementation of the NUP
remains compatible with local priorities
particularly as they affect urban
vulnerability.
• Encourage local revenue generation
activities on the part of municipalities so
that fiscal sustainability in the medium
term accompanies improved contributions
to and a better return ratio of resources
from the MoI in Kabul.
• Strengthen the coordinating function of
MUDH in parallel with a development
programme run from the centre,
equivalent to the NSP. The delivery of
such a programme through MUDH
provincial departments would have the
effect of improving vertical inter-
governmental relations and create
visibility of and trust in the capacity of
central government.
Forward-Looking Strategies
• Ensure all urban projects, programmes
and plans are harmonised within the
context of an operationalised NUP guided
by a strategic urban policy framework.
• Integrate on-the-job capabi l i ty
enhancement with curriculum develop-
ment in Afghan universities and technical
colleges focused on urban planning and
urban management but where relevant,
still located within existing faculties of
architecture and/or engineering.
• Introduce and monitor infringements or
violation of land titles and security of
tenure within an ongoing process of land
titling.
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• Extend integrated area-based project
approaches to citywide development
strategies with local authorities
coordinating a wider array of urban
development partners.
• Strengthen citizens’ ability to engage
proactively with the NUP and urban
planning and management processes,
through ongoing support and civic
education by intermediary and advocacy
NGOs.
• Strengthen and institutionalise structures
for regular consultation and commun-
ication between government organisations
and urban dwellers.
• Streamline MUDH and monitor the
effectiveness of new structures through
peer reviews and citizen satisfaction
surveys.
• Enforce anti-corruption measures through
sufficient funding, regular consultation
among regulatory and executive agencies
and monitoring accountability to citizens.
• Work towards a sustainable resource base
for the implementation of the NUP in all
prov inc ia l  centres  and ensure
institutionalisation of performance
improvement mechanisms.
• Extend local revenue generation activities
for some enhanced fiscal autonomy on
the part of municipalities while ensuring
returns to central government and
cohesion with national policies through
coordination by a streamlined MUDH.
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(1) Priority assessments
Political, economic, and social development issues and challenges as they pertain to urban
governance in Afghanistan (current state; political, financial and organisational bottlenecks):
• Security of land tenure and access to land; role of planning
• Employment and income generation
• Sewerage, sanitation and health
• Basic services provision: water, electricity, policing, transportation
• Social inclusion and support networks
(2) Inter- and intra-organisational structures of competence, accountability, cooperation
and conflict resolution among and within local (urban) and national-level institutions of
government, e.g. municipality-Ministry of Interior; role of MUDH.
(3) Management issues with regard to efficiency of service delivery in the urban realm:
coverage, frequency, quality, and responsibility.
(4) Links and leverages between governmental (local, national) and non-governmental
institutions (local civil society, international agencies) in the context of urban governance
— degree of communication and cooperation in (re)construction, accuracy of needs assessment,
extent of joint agenda-setting, accountability relationships and complaint management
mechanisms.
(5) Additional issues that the respondent would like to point out or comment on.
Lead questions:
• What are the three most urgent issues in [city] that [actor, agency] is responsible for
and that you think need to be addressed in the immediate future?
• How are you/they going to address them?
• Can these issues be solved? How? If not, why not? What would be needed to deal with
these issues successfully?
• Do you think that [actor, agency], at the current stage and in the future, has
[a] enough financial resources
[b] enough human resources
[c] enough equipment
[d] enough political influence?
• To what extent is capacity building taking place? Through which channels and mechanisms
is [actor, agency] in touch with residents?
• In which areas is [actor, agency] cooperating with other agencies, organisations,
governmental offices, local initiatives? Has this cooperation been satisfying for you so
far? What should and can be improved, and how?
Appendix A: Interview Guide for Key Informants
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a)  List of key informants
Urban Governance, Urban Management and Vulnerability — List of Key Informants
Kabul
Name Function Organisation
Dr. Qiamuddin Djallalzada Deputy Minister
Tom Carter Advisor
Waheed Sultan Advisor
MUDH
Eng. Assadulhaq Ezmarai Head of Town Planning Dept.
Khuja Faizuddin Head of Housing Dept.
Wali Mohammad Akseer Head of Planning Dept.
Ghulam Sakhi Noorzad (n.a.) Mayor
Mohammad Ali Niazi Head of Policy and Coordination Kabul Municipality
Dr. Saheb Nazar Muradi Head of Control of Constructions
Abdul Basir Farahi Provincial Court Chairman SPDRC
Shahmahmood Miakhel Senior Advisor on Policing MoI
Katherina Lumpp Senior Protection Officer, OCM UNHCR
Soraya Goga Urban Specialist
World Bank
Robin Rajack Urban Specialist
Jason A.Girard Urban Advisor
USAID
Charles Setchell Disaster Management Specialist
Rob Hager Team Leader Taxation and Municipal Finance Bearing Point
Pushpa Pathak Senior Urban Advisor CG Focal Point, MUDH
Eng. Mohammad Sharif National Human Settlement Officer, CG
UN-Habitat
M.Y.Safar Land Management Consultant, CG
Lalith Lankatilleke Chief Technical Advisor
Nick Leader Advisor
UNAMA
Antonio Giustozzi Consultant
Bas Rozemuller Chief Technical Advisor, SEED International Labour
Organization
Bijay Kumar Country Director ActionAid
Jolyon Leslie Program Manager
Aga Khan Trust for Culture
Anna Soave Project Leader
Mir Ahmed Joyenda Deputy Director, Communications AREU
Frank Steiner Project Manager Beller Consulting
Jalaluddin Ahmed Country Director BRAC
Michelle Kendall Project Manager
CARE
Eng. M. Farid Safi Program Manager
Anita Anastasia Project Manager GTZ, fr. Mercycorps
Jennifer Escott Legal Advisor NRC
Appendix B: Key Informants Interviewed
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Mazar-i-Sharif
Name Function Organisation
M. Younus Moqim Mayor
Eng. Mohammed Malik Head of Construction Dept. Mazar Municipality
Mohammed Sarwar Head of Planning Dept. 
Faisal Programme Coordinator ActionAid
n.n. Head of Office Action Contre la Faim
Mr. Amomuddin Regional Director Aga Khan Development
Network 
Eng. Mohammed Director AREA
Glenn McKenzie-Frazer Customs Advisor Bearing Point
Eng. Islamuddin Regional Manager
M. Jawed CF Manager District 2 CFDO
Mr. Jaffar CF Manager District 10
Abdul Rahman Rasikh Commissioner Civil Service Reform
Commission
Volker Huefing Head of Projects
GAA
Martin Guth Construction Project Coordinator
Martin Ocaga Head of Office IOM
Simon Russell Head of Office NRC
Col. John Henderson Head of PRT PRT
Mr Aziz, Mr Mariam Project Leaders Save the Children UK
Michele Lipner Regional Head UNAMA
Eng. Zia Radyar Provincial Manager UN-Habitat
Anne Campbell Head of Office
Dr. Miwas Project Coordinator
UNHCR
Mr. Osman Project Coordinator
Nisa, Rasia, Obtal Field workers (focus group)
Siria Maniam Head of Office UNOPS
Herat
Name Function Organisation
Alhaj M. Rafiq Mujadidi Mayor Herat Municipality
M. Haqiq Regional Programme Manager AIHRC
Steve McKennan Taxation specialist Bearing Point
Mr. Mohiuddin (n.a.) Programme Manager BRAC
David Boyes Project Coordinator Catholic Relief Services
Selwyn Mukkath Project Leader
Jawed Ganji Head administrator DACAAR
H. Brommer Head of Mission
Diplomatic mission of
Germany in HeratFranz-Xaver Vogl Head of Police Reconstruction project
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Peggy Sieller Head of Office IOM
Abdul Khaliq Stanikzai Regional Manager
Sanayee Development
Foundation
Tim Williams Project Coordinator
Abu Diek Head of Office UNAMA
Sayed Sadullah Wahab Provincial Manager UN-Habitat 
Claire Bourgeois Head of Office
Maurizio Molina Associate Repatriation Officer UNHCR
Elizabeth Cossor Consultant
Baba Danbappa Resident Programme Officer UNICEF
Altaf Hussain Joya Regional Coordinator UNODC
Graham Livingston (n.a.) Head of Office UNOPS
Anne Bodine Head of Mission (Herat) USAID/PRT
Andrés González Head of Office
War Child Netherlands
Chris Mastaglio Project Leader
Gabriele Chrupala Head of Office
World Vision International
Mr. Shafiq Director of Operations
b)  Distribution of key informant interviews
Herat
30% Kabul40%
Mazar
30%
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This research is part of a study of a policy-oriented research organisation (AREU) through
which we try to understand the concerns and problems of people living in Afghan cities.
While we are not going to provide any direct assistance to you as a result of this study, we
will inform the municipality and the ministries about our findings. We hope that they,
together with international agencies, will follow up on our recommendations. The interview
comprises five areas and will take about 45 minutes of your time.
We would like you to tell us your story with regard to five topic areas and focus on those
issues that are of greatest importance to you. We can assure you that we are not going to
pass on any names nor disclose anyone’s identity. No data on a single identifiable household
will be passed on; apart from exemplary responses (quotes) we are only going to pass on
aggregated data. We encourage you to answer our questions as accurately as possible, tell
us when you want us to repeat or rephrase a question, and share with us any additional
concerns you might have.
(0) Observation during the interview
• Number, size and equipment of room(s)
• Number of people in the room; what are their relationships?
• General state of facilities, hygiene/cleanliness, running water, electricity
(1) Access to land / shelter
Please tell us what it is like to live in this neighbourhood, why you moved here, where you
lived before, and whether you intend to stay here.
Areas that we want to cover:
1. Since when do you live here?
2. Where are you from originally (location/age; rural or urban)?
3. How many times have you moved/been moved and why?
4. How did you decide to live here? Do you know what type of land this area is (e.g.
government land, municipality land or private)?
5. Have you built the house yourself, bought it (do you have a title deed?), maintain it for
exile relatives, rent it, or teamed up with others (whom?) to afford the rent?
6. How much on your monthly income do you spend on housing? How has this changed
throughout the last two years?
7. Have you heard of people in this neighbourhood who had to move away? Do you know
why? Do you think you will be allowed to stay here? Do you have to pay anyone or any
agency in order to be able/allowed to stay here? If you think you will not stay here,
where do you plan to go, and why?
(2) Social networks and collective action
Please give us an idea of who you are in touch with regularly and who you can rely on for
help and support. Are you making decisions together with other people, and are you then
trying to act collectively as a group to make your voice heard?
Areas that we want to cover:
8. Do you know your neighbours? Do you talk to them regularly? If not, why? Who do you
talk to on a day-to-day basis?
Appendix C: Interview Guide for Household-Level
Informants
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9. Do you consider yourself part of a group or a community that you can rely on if you need
support or help? What makes you rely on or trust the other people?
family, ethnic, neighbourhood, same work or skill, other?
10. Who do you turn to if there is a problem that concerns not only the people in this house
but also your neighbours (e.g. waste piles up, sewage is not working, no electricity)?
11. Would you team up with others to address these issues? If yes, with whom would you
team up? Why? If no, why? Have you actually teamed up with others to solve problems?
Which problems were you trying to solve? Have you solved them? How? If not, why couldn’t
you solve them?
(3) Livelihoods
Could you now please explain to us how you afford your expenditures, and who in this house
is contributing to your income?
Areas that we want to cover:
12. Which skills / formal training do you have?
13. How does this household currently generate its income? Has this changed during the
past two years?
14. Do you consider your income source sustainable? If yes, why? If no, why?
15. If you could, what type of work you like to perform? What prevents you from performing
this work now?
16. Who else is currently contributing to your income?
17. Who in this house (this family) is working, and who isn’t? What type of work are those
who are working performing? Why are the others not working —
e.g. no demand for skill, disability, not allowed, child care, other?
(4) Service delivery
Now we would like to know which services you receive, and under which conditions you
receive them. Do you have to pay for them? And do you feel secure in this neighbourhood?
Areas that we want to cover:
18. How often is waste collected in this street? Is this happening regularly? Is it sufficient,
or is some of it left over? How often would it have to be collected to be sufficient? Is
anyone asking you to pay for waste collection?
19. How many people are using the same sanitation facilities? Have you experienced problems
with these facilities? If yes, which problems? What have you done about it?
20. Do you have access to running water? Since when? Who arranged it? Are you paying for
it? How much? Did you have to pay someone to get it?
21. Do you have electricity? In all rooms? How did you get electricity? Are you paying for
it? How much? Did you have to pay someone to get it?
22. Do you have heat during the winter? How did you obtain it? Are you paying for it? How
much are you paying?
23. Do the children go to school? Where is the school? How do they get there? Are you paying
for the school? How much are you paying? If they are not going to school — why?
24. When you need to see a doctor or go to the hospital, is this possible? Do you have to
pay for these services? Whom do you have to pay? If you do not have access to a doctor
and/or a hospital, why?
25. Do you feel secure in this neighbourhood? If no, why are you feeling insecure? Has there
been any violent incident in this neighborhood? What happened? Has there been any
response or investigation by the authorities?
26. Is public transport within reach? Are you using it? If yes, do you have any suggestions
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how to improve it? If no, why are you not using it? What would have to happen so you
would/could use it?
(5) Representation, accountability, complaint management and improvement
We would also like to understand whether you can get in touch with people from the district
or the government, and whether anyone is representing you and your interests. Who has
been helpful to you in the context of your housing, income and service situation?
Areas that we want to cover:
27. Is anyone/any agency or public body formally representing you? Do you have a shura?
28. Is anyone/any agency or public body informally representing you? In which setting does
this happen?
29. Do you feel fairly represented? If not, why? When would you feel properly represented?
30. Have you ever contacted the municipality in case of a problem (e.g. waste piles up,
sewage is not working, no electricity)? Have they listened to you? Could you contact
them? If not, why not?
31. Which (other) officials, agencies, individuals have been useful to you and how?
32. Which officials, agencies and individuals have not been useful and why?
33. Do you have to pay in order to obtain support from officials, agencies, and individuals?
Has the amount changed over the last couple of months?
— Priority assessment
Finally, we would like to know which of the following issues is most important to you. What
is the problem that should be solved first or the service that is absolutely crucial for you,
and why? What comes next? Please help us prioritise these issues from your perspective,
and add anything that is equally or even more important to you.
34. Which of the following factors is most important to you in order to feel at ease (not
worried) — and why? Can you rank these issues?
• Security of tenure (having a secure place to stay)
• Stable source of income (earning enough to live without anxiety)
• Receiving public services (such as schooling, access to health services, electricity, water,
waste collection)
• Being represented, listened and responded to
• Physical protection against violence and harassment
• Other: (please specify!)
— Additional information
Is there anything else that you would like to address regarding your housing situation,
contacts and people who can help you, your income and expenditures, the services you
receive or don’t receive, or your relationship with the authorities? What is it, and why is
it important to you?
Appendix D: Distribution and Location of
Household-Level Interviews
a) Distribution of Household-Level interviews
City Districts Total
Kabul D1 (11) D3, D13 (7) D16 (11) D17 (9) 38
Mazar-i-Sharif D2 (5) D7 (4) D10 (4) 13
Herat D6 (5) D7 (2) D9 (5) 12
b.1) Location of Household-Level Interviews in Kabul (map courtesy of UN-Habitat)
Kabul 52%
Herat 23%
Mazar 25%
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District 7:
Aqebe Gumruk / Tashgurganeha
District 10:
Ariana / Ahle Chapan
District 2:
Karte Nowshad
b.2) Location of Household-Level Interviews in Mazar-i-Sharif (map courtesy of UN-Habitat)
b.3) Location of Household-Level Interviews in Herat (map courtesy of AIMS Kabul)
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ACF Action Contre la Faim
AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
CAWSS Central Authority for Water Supply and Sewerage
CDC community development council
CF community forum
CSO civil society organisation
HPD/HPCC Housing and Property Directorate and Claims Commission (Kosovo)
IDPs internally displaced persons
IOM International Organization for Migration
KURP Kabul Urban Rehabilitation Programme
LPU Land and Property Unit (Timor-Leste)
MoF Ministry of Finance
MoI Ministry of Interior
MoT Ministry of Transportation
MUDH Ministry of Urban Development and Housing
NGO non-governmental organisation
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council
NSP National Solidarity Programme
NUP National Urban Programme
UMCG Urban Management Consultative Group
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID United States Agency for International Development
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)70
Issues Paper Series
Charahi Ansari
(opposite the Insaf Hotel and Popolano’s Restaurant)
Shahr-e-Naw, Kabul, Afghanistan
Phone: +93 (0) 70 276-637
E-mail: areu@areu.org.af  Web: www.areu.org.af
